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NO SHORTCUTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS:  BAIL 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIAL 
CAROLINE L. DAVIDSON  
It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have 
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.  
Honoring the presumption of innocence is often difficult; sometimes we 
must pay substantial social costs as a result of our commitment to the 
values we espouse.  But at the end of the day the presumption of 
innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with those whom 
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INTRODUCTION2 
Release at international tribunals has come a long way, and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has done 
a lot right.  Whereas defendants before the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals 
were automatically detained and could not seek release,3 at the ICTY, pre-
                                                 
 2. Due to problems with publishing diacritics and accents, I have replaced all diacritics 
and accented letters with the visually closest English letter.  Also, in some instances, I have 
retained the full citation to a case when a shortened citation would be appropriate so as to 
retain identifying information that will help readers distinguish between cases and locate the 
primary source.  Occasionally, I have omitted extremely long URLs and instead I have 
indicated the website where the source is available through a search engine. 
 3. See SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 84 (2003).  It bears noting that these Tribunals operated before the enactment 
of the major instruments codifying fundamental human rights.   
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trial release and release during breaks from trial has become increasingly 
common.  Even at the ICTY‘s sister tribunal, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), provisional release lags behind, because only 
three defendants have been released.4   
Nevertheless, at the ICTY, detention remains the starting point, and all 
defendants, other than those accused of contempt of court,5 are detained for 
trial.  The acquittal of eleven of the 121 defendants whose cases have been 
completed, many after having spent several years in detention awaiting 
judgment, makes default detention for trial a concern.6  These defendants 
receive no compensation for their lost time. 
Even for ICTY defendants who are released pre-trial because they pose 
no flight risk or danger, detention is inevitable.  Once trial begins, the best 
they can hope for is to be released for court breaks or for short breaks due 
to illness or some other such circumstance.  Litigants and the court appear 
to accept the baseline premise, with little or no discussion, that trial means 
detention.   
This state of affairs is idiosyncratic.  Domestic jurisdictions do not draw 
this stark line between pre-trial and trial for the purposes of release.  
Human rights norms likewise draw no such line. 
True, trials for genocide or crimes against humanity are not trials for 
shoplifting.  Courts and scholars have made much of the uniqueness of 
international tribunals.  They have argued that the gravity of the charges, 
the complexity of the cases, the absence of an international police force, 
and the absence of explicit penalties for failure to appear, among other 
things, distinguish international criminal tribunals from domestic courts 
                                                 
 4. Daniel J. Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged Guilty:  Provisional Release at the ICTR, 
44 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 577, 577 (2003).  
 5. The court issued summons in lieu of arrest warrants for some journalists charged 
with contempt for releasing confidential information.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hartmann, 
Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Order in Lieu of an Indictment on Contempt,  
¶ 3 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 27, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_hartmann/ind/en/080827.pdf; Prosecutor v. Marijacic 
& Rebic, Case No. IT-95-14-R77.2, Decision on Review of Indictment (Int‘l Crim. Trib. 
For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 26, 2005), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_marijacic_rebic/tdec/en/050426.htm. 
 6. See Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of International Criminal Tribunals in 
Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8 NW. U. J. INT‘L HUM. RTS. 1, 14 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v8/n1/1/ (noting that, according to data 
provided by the United Nations Detention Unit (UNDU) in The Hague, as of October 31, 
2008, the average time of detention before final conviction was five years, that several 
defendants had been detained considerably longer, and that eleven alleged war criminals 
have been acquitted by the ICTY after spending lengthy periods in detention).  Proceedings 
have concluded as to 125 ICTY defendants.  See Key Figures of ICTY Cases, 
http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last updated June 30, 2010). 
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and render inapposite human rights jurisprudence on the reasonableness of 
periods of detention.7  
However, international trials are also unique in ways that favor release.  
The accused are far from their families and support networks.8  At the 
ICTY, defendants are also often considerably older and in worse health 
than detainees in domestic jurisdictions.9  In addition, unlike in domestic 
jurisdictions, many international defendants are not direct perpetrators of 
the crimes, at least as the term is used in common parlance.  Because they 
are not the trigger-pullers but rather the higher ups, many are, arguably, 
unlikely to be dangerous if released.10 
But, most importantly, accused international defendants are detained for 
very long periods of time.  Trials are long.11  The ICTY has compounded 
the scale of the already massive cases by joining many defendants in 
widely varying roles in single cases.12  Detainees spend many years in 
detention before their cases are resolved.13 
                                                 
 7. See infra discussion accompanying notes 167–70 (noting the factors that many 
argue distinguish international criminal tribunals from domestic jurisdictions). 
 8. See Hans Holthuis, Registrar, Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Diplomatic Seminar of the Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague 3, 10 
(June 2008) (on file with author) (stating that ―[i]n the case of the UNDU, its international 
character and unique detainee population raise further difficulties in terms of health care.  
Indeed, the particular profile and specific personal circumstances of ICTY detainees, being 
in many instances former high ranked political and military leaders, can aggravate the 
adverse impact of prison environment on their health.  The distance from the detainees‘ 
family and the familial social support network, as well as the detainees‘ lack of familiarity 
with the surroundings, inevitably impact on the health condition of the detainees.‖). 
 9. Id. at 3–7 (noting that at the UNDU, the average age of detainees was over twenty 
years older than in domestic jurisdictions and that over eighty percent of those detained 
were over the age of fifty). 
 10. One could argue, however, that even those who never held a gun may be likely to 
present the very danger that landed them in the dock—fomenting ethnic tensions and 
participating in crimes through policy-making.  
 11. See James Meernik & Rosa Aloisi, Is Justice Delayed at the International Criminal 
Tribunals?, 91 JUDICATURE 276, 281 (2008) (stating that the average length of proceedings 
for top-level political military leaders at the ICTY is 1406 days, 1181 days for mid-level 
defendants and 950 days for low-level defendants); see also Stephanos Bibas & William W. 
Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 
DUKE L.J. 637, 685 (2010) (noting that the average ICTY or ICTR case takes one and a half 
years, millions of dollars, and hundreds of witnesses). 
 12. The International Tribunals have engaged to varying degrees in the practice of 
joining several defendants and also several crimes and geographic areas into one trial.  See 
Laura Bingham, Strategy or Process?  Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 24 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 687, 706 (2006) (noting that the 
ICTY has favored multi-defendant mega-trials as part of its completion strategy; whereas 
the ICTR has focused on trial readiness with smaller cases, and the ICTR Prosecutor has in 
fact sought to sever cases to bring them to trial sooner). 
 13. See Schomburg supra note 6, at 14 (―[T]he average time spent in pre-trial detention 
was 511 days.  The average time spent in detention during trial was 489 days.  The average 
time spent in detention while awaiting the finalization of appeal proceedings was 663 
days.‖). 
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Detention prior to conviction is a serious infringement on the rights of 
defendants and has many real-life repercussions. Human rights implicated 
by detention include the rights to be presumed innocent, to liberty, and to a 
speedy and fair trial.14  As one Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada has 
stated, ―[w]hen bail is denied to an individual who is merely accused of a 
criminal offence, the presumption of innocence is necessarily infringed.‖15  
Detention or release of accused international defendants also implicates 
victims‘ rights to protection and, arguably, to participation in the criminal 
process. 
Beyond normative concerns about release, there are practical ones.  One 
of the likely explanations for the de facto ―detention during trial‖ regime of 
the ICTY is the difficulty of sorting out an alternative plan.  Whereas 
defendants who pose no risk of flight or danger to the community in a 
domestic jurisdiction can be released to their homes, defendants before the 
ICTY have no homes in The Hague.  Their homelessness poses both 
strategic and practical problems for release.  They are deprived of the 
argument that their ties to the community reduce the risk of flight because, 
of course, they have no ties.  Further, there is the prosaic but real concern 
about where to put defendants if they are released.  Also, who pays for their 
accommodations?  How freely can they move about?  Will the host country 
permit defendants to live there when not detained?   
Although the ICTY and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have 
done their best to make conditions of pre-trial detention non-punitive, to 
such an extent that the United Nations Detention Unit (UNDU) has been 
described as the ―Hague Hilton,‖16 defendants are not at liberty.  Moreover, 
a report of the Registrar of the ICTY, prompted by deaths and two suicides 
at the UNDU,17 contends that the exceptional length of the detention of 
ICTY accused is more akin to stays at penal institutions in national 
                                                 
 14. See Mark Findlay, Internationalised Criminal Trial and Access to Justice, 2 INT‘L 
CRIM. L. REV. 237, 238 (2002). 
 15. R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 SCC 64, ¶ 48 (Can.) (Iacobucci, J., 
dissenting).   
 16. See Doreen Carvajal, War Crimes Court Draws Criticism Over Travel Subsidies for 
Visits, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at A6.  The article also discusses the ICC‘s expensive 
practice of flying defendants‘ families in for visits from the farthest corners of the earth as a 
means of addressing their lengthy detention. 
 17. Slavko Dokmanovic committed suicide at the UNDU on June 29, 1998.  Milan 
Kovacevic and Slobodan Milosevic died of natural causes at the UNDU on August 1, 1998 
and March 11, 2006, respectively.  Milan Babic, who had been transferred to a domestic 
jurisdiction to serve his sentence after pleading guilty, also committed suicide at the UNDU 
on March 5, 2006.  He had returned to The Hague to testify in Milan Martic‘s trial.  See Key 
Figures of ICTY Cases, INT‘L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last updated June 30, 2010). 
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jurisdictions.18  It concluded that ―there is a very real and serious risk of a 
life-threatening episode occurring at the UNDU at some time in the future 
and without warning.‖19 
A few scholars have written about provisional release at the ICTY and 
ICTR in the context of pre-trial detention.20  However, the de facto regime 
of detaining all defendants for trial has received little attention.21  This 
Article seeks to fill this gap. 
I attempt to offer a better framework for provisional release decisions 
that applies both before and during international criminal trials.  In Part I, I 
explain why provisional release at international tribunals matters. I contend 
that the foremost objective of international criminal tribunals should be to 
promote respect for human rights and the rule of law.22  Focusing on the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as interpreted by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)23 and domestic law, especially 
                                                 
 18. Hans Holthuis, Registrar, In‘t Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Diplomatic 
Seminar of the Int‘l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, at the Hague (June 10, 2008) 
[hereinafter ICTY Registrar‘s Report].  The ICTY Registrar‘s Report was given in a 
diplomatic seminar at the ICTY on June 10, 2008.  See Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. 
IT-04-74-T, Decision on Slobodan Praljak‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 30–31 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 18, 2009).  
 19. ICTY Registrar‘s Report. 
 20. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald & Jenny Martinez, Provisional Release at the ICTY:  A 
Work in Progress, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 231, 236 (Richard May et 
al. eds., 2001) (discussing concerns Trial Chamber decisions often raise when denying 
release); Rearick, supra note 4, at 579 (discussing provisional release at the ICTR); 
Matthew M. DeFrank, Commentary, ICTY Provisional Release:  Current Practice, a 
Dissenting Voice, and the Case for a Rule Change, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1429–30 (2002) 
(noting Judge Robinson‘s dissatisfaction with the current provisional release system). 
 21. At least one scholar has flagged the issue in passing.  David Aronofsky contended 
that it is ―inexplicable that international defendants who can afford bail and have nowhere to 
flee are nonetheless not allowed bail while on trial.‖  See David Aronofsky, International 
War Crimes & Other Criminal Courts:  Ten Recommendations for Where We Go From 
Here and How to Get There—Looking to a Permanent International Criminal Tribunal, 34 
DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 17, 26 (2006).  Aronofsky characterized the ―disregard for the 
right to bail, accompanied by the parallel right to a quick bail hearing‖ as ―[o]ne of the great 
travesties characterizing international criminal cases to date.‖  Id. 
 22. See Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment:  The 
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 
STAN. J. INT‘L L. 39, 42 (2007) (―It would be ironic and counterproductive were 
[international criminal law] trials to undermine some international human rights standards in 
an effort to vindicate others.‖); see also Mirjan Damaska, What is the Point of International 
Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 355–56 (2008) (noting that it would be ironic 
if the judicial system disregarded humanistic values). 
 23. The ECtHR is charged with interpreting and enforcing the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which came into force on 
September 3, 1953 and sets out the rights and freedoms that member states agree to ensure 
to anyone in their jurisdiction.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; JEAN-
FRANCOIS RENUCCI, INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:  THE 
RIGHTS GUARANTEED AND THE PROTECTION MECHANISM 5 (2005).  Prior to November 1998, 
CAROLINE DAVIDSON.OFFTOPRINTER 60.1 
2010] NO SHORTCUTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 7 
 
that of the United States, I discuss the normative and functional reasons for 
a more transparent and human rights protective provisional release regime.  
The ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence is of particular interest because 
judges of the ICTY and the ICC often cite them in their provisional release 
decisions.24   
In Part II, I explain why provisional release at the ICTY has failed to live 
up to international human rights norms and focus on the de facto detention 
for trial regime and the newly added ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian 
circumstances‖ requirement for release after the close of the prosecution‘s 
case.  I focus on the ICTY, because, other than the ICC, it is the only 
international tribunal to have released defendants at all and has the greatest 
wealth of jurisprudence on provisional release. 
Finally, in Part III, I evaluate alternative measures to address some of the 
ICTY‘s human rights problems on provisional release, including 
streamlining and possibly restructuring trials, revamping the risk of flight 
and danger inquiry, compensating defendants for wrongful detention, 
affording victims the right to participate in release decisions and, finally, 
launching a concerted effort to eliminate the practical barriers to release. 
                                                 
the European Commission of Human Rights decided the admissibility of cases before the 
ECHR.  Since then, the two institutions have merged.  The ECtHR issues decision binding 
on member states and has provoked legislative changes in member states.  European Court 
of Human Rights, 50 Years of Activity:  The European Court of Human Rights—Some Facts 
and Figures 3 (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ACD46A0F-615A-48B9-
89D6-8480AFCC29FD/0/FactsAndFiguresEN.pdf.  
 24. ICTY judges often turn to ECtHR jurisprudence for guidance, and yet are divided 
on whether ECHR law binds the Tribunal due to the international nature of the Tribunal, the 
gravity and complexity of the cases, and the like.  E.g., Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, 
Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 46 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ademi, 
Case No. IT-01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 12 & n.8 (Int‘l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm; Prosecutor v. Delalic, 
Mucic, Delic, & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release 
filed by the Accused Zejnil Delalic, ¶¶ 21–26 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Sept. 25, 1996), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/60925PR2.htm; see also Prosecutor v. Bemba 
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the Interim Release, ¶ 35 (Aug. 14, 2009), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc727230.pdf (noting that the ICC‘s rule on periodic 
review of decisions on interim release must be interpreted and applied in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights and citing several international human rights 
instruments).   
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I. WHY PROVISIONAL RELEASE AT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS MATTERS 
A. The Objectives of International Criminal Law 
The purposes of international criminal law are many.  International 
criminal courts not only strive for general law enforcement goals such as 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, but also seek to 
fulfill a myriad of goals unique to international criminal courts, including 
producing ―a reliable historical record of the context of international 
crime,‖ providing ―a venue for giving voice to international crime‘s many 
victims,‖ spreading human rights values, developing international criminal 
law, and promoting peace and security.25  All the while, of course, these 
―objectives [are to] be pursued in proceedings solicitous of the rights of the 
accused.‖26   
Achieving all of these aims is a tall order.  As Professor Damaska has 
argued, international criminal law has suffered from there being too many 
objectives and no hierarchy among them.27  This problem is rendered all 
the more vexing in that these manifold objectives are often in tension with 
one another.   
Moreover, international criminal law has serious constraints in 
accomplishing many of these goals in the first place.  Although retributive 
justice ―is the dominant stated objective for punishment of atrocity 
perpetrators at the national and international levels,‖28 international 
criminal tribunals have significant limitations in achieving retribution.  The 
inherent selectivity of tribunals, meaning their ability to prosecute only a 
few perpetrators from but a few of the world‘s equally dire situations, 
challenges the retributive aims because decisions on prosecution and 
punishment ride on political or practical constraints rather than a 
determination of the gravity of offenses and the just deserts of the world‘s 
perpetrators of atrocities.29  Likewise, the disproportionality between the 
severity of sanctions and the gravity of offenses,30 as well as the reliance of 
                                                 
 25. Damaska, supra note 22, at 331.   
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 331–39 (listing numerous goals of international criminal courts and 
addressing the tensions that arise due to the lack of harmony and failure to prioritize); see 
also Sloane, supra note 22, at 45 (discussing the unduly high expectations of what 
international criminal law can do and listing some of the oft-cited objectives). 
 28. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 150 (2007).  
 29. See id. at 151. 
 30. Id. at 154 (surveying national and international institutions and noting that 
sentences for extraordinary international crimes typically are no longer than for ordinary 
municipal crimes; sentences given by international tribunals likewise are no longer than 
those generally given by national institutions; and, finally, within institutions, including the 
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international tribunals on plea bargains, undermine the tribunals‘ retributive 
function.31 
Similarly, international tribunals also have limitations in deterring people 
from committing atrocities.32 The prevailing wisdom on deterrence is that 
deterrence depends on the existence of a high chance of prosecution and 
prompt punishment, not on the severity of punishment.33  The reality that 
only a tiny fraction of perpetrators will ever be prosecuted undermines the 
deterrent effect of international criminal tribunals.  Moreover, as Professor 
Mark Drumbl notes, it is far from clear that would-be perpetrators of 
atrocities are rational enough actors to be deterred by fear of punishment.34  
The commission of major atrocities, such as the genocide at Srebrenica and 
the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, well after the establishment of the ICTY do 
little to bolster the effectiveness of international tribunals as mechanisms of 
deterrence.35 
The efficacy of international tribunals in achieving the goals more 
specific to the international arena, such as creating a historical record and 
promoting peace and security, is also debatable.  Many argue that truth 
commissions are a better means of creating a historical record than a 
criminal trial, particularly one following the adversarial model.36  Criminal 
trials, although useful in some contexts, likewise may not always be the 
best way to promote peace and security.  Trials may undermine transitional 
justice aims by interfering with other tools, such as amnesty and political 
solutions, to achieve peace.37 
                                                 
ICTY, there are sentencing disparities not explained by valid retributive goals, such as 
differences in the gravity of the offenses).   
 31. Id. at 164 (arguing that, despite the many benefits of plea bargains, they ―compete 
with the notion that perpetrators deserve to be punished‖ since plea bargains hinge on 
factors other than the gravity of the offense, such as the willingness of the defendant to 
cooperate, the information he or she has and institutional concerns). 
 32. See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 
23 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 473, 474 (1999) (characterizing the deterrent effect of international 
prosecutions as ―at best a plausible but largely untested assumption‖).  But see Payam 
Akhavan, Beyond Impunity:  Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 
95 AM. J. INT‘L L. 7, 7 (2001) (arguing that international tribunals can have a deterrent effect 
in the long run). 
 33. Id. at 169–70. 
 34. Id. at 171 (arguing that social pressures and a need to commit criminal acts in order 
to survive may well prove more compelling than fear of criminal sanction). 
 35. DRUMBL, supra note 28, at 169. 
 36. E.g., Neha Jain, Between the Scylla and Charybdis of Prosecution and 
Reconciliation:  The Khmer Rouge Trials and the Promise of International Criminal Justice, 
20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 247, 267 (2010); Ivan Simonovic, Comment, Attitudes and 
Types of Reaction Toward Past War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, 29 YALE J. INT‘L L. 
343, 349 (2004). 
 37. See Jain, supra note 36, at 267 (noting that unlike criminal trials, truth commissions 
may provide a more accurate historical account of the causes and consequences of mass 
violence); see also John Bolton, Speech Two:  Reject and Oppose the International Criminal 
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Empirical evidence appears to support this skepticism over the efficacy 
of international criminal tribunals in achieving these special goals.  For 
example, Janine Clark‘s recent study based on interviews of people in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded that the ICTY did a poor job in 
achieving the goals announced by its first President, Antonio Cassese, 
which included dissipating calls for revenge, individualizing guilt, 
establishing a historical record and contributing to reconciliation.38  The 
author concluded that, at worst, the ICTY has achieved none of these goals.  
At best, the infrequency of revenge attacks suggested that the ICTY had 
helped only in the first aim of reducing calls for vengeance by creating a 
normative understanding that criminal trials, not vigilantism, are the way to 
address past crimes.39   
The law of provisional release at international criminal tribunals 
demonstrates the need to identify and prioritize achievable objectives of 
international criminal law.40  This decision on priorities will shape the 
provisional release regime used.  If the primary objective of tribunals is to 
give victims a voice and to validate their suffering, then a very strict 
detention regime may be appropriate—the presumption of innocence and 
defendants‘ rights to liberty and a fair trial be damned.  If human rights are 
the top priority, then the detention regime may look somewhat different. 
Easy or not, a number of scholars advocate prioritizing the goal of 
encouraging respect for human rights through international criminal law.41  
I agree.  One view of international criminal tribunals is as penal institutions 
geared at ―expressing‖ public condemnation of acts contrary to 
international human rights and humanitarian law.42  According to this view, 
the tribunals are a potential ―engine of jurisprudential development at the 
                                                 
Court, in TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?  THREE OPTIONS PRESENTED AS 
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES 37, 48 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 1999) (providing that 
truth commissions have a greater willingness to pardon offenders and that they may help 
mitigate risks of future conflict).   
 38. Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, Findings of an Empirical 
Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 463, 464 (2009). 
 39. Id. at 471. 
 40. See Damaska, supra note 22, at 355–56 (discussing the relationship between 
deterrence and culpability in an effort to determine the proper sentence to impose and 
doctrine to follow). 
 41. See CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 46 (2001) (―The main rationale for international criminal law is . . . the 
protection and promotion of human rights in the global society.‖). 
 42. See DRUMBL, supra note 28, at 173 (labeling this conception of international 
criminal justice ―expressivism‖); Damaska, supra note 22, at 343 (presenting a similar 
vision, which he terms a ―didactic‖ model); Sloane, supra note 22, at 42, 44 (labeling the 
conception ―expressivism‖); see also Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization through 
Trials for Violations of International Law:  Four Conditions for Success and Their 
Application to Trials of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT‘L L. 427, 430 n.6 
(2009) (using the term ―norm internalization‖). 
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local level,‖ which can encourage ―the legal and normative internalization 
of international human rights and humanitarian law.‖43  Janine Clark‘s 
empirical study lends credence to this view of international criminal law. 
Still, promoting norms condemning genocide and the like through 
punishment of norm violators must be done in a manner consistent with the 
overall human rights promotion agenda.44  As Robert Sloane argues, ―[i]t 
would be ironic and counterproductive were [international criminal law] 
trials to undermine some international human rights standards in an effort 
to vindicate others.‖45  German scholar Christoph Safferling concludes the 
same, stating, ―[h]uman rights can only be protected through human rights.  
If human rights are to be protected via criminal prosecution, the applied 
system must itself be strictly compatible with human rights.‖46  This respect 
for human rights also serves transitional justice needs by increasing not 
only actual fairness, but also the appearance of fairness, and by promoting 
respect for the rule of law.47 
The interconnected transnational world in which tribunals operate makes 
this goal of human rights promotion all the more important.  Judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys return to their home countries armed 
with knowledge acquired at the international tribunals.48  The need to 
respect the human rights of defendants should be first and foremost among 
the lessons they carry with them.  Indeed, there is already evidence that 
                                                 
 43. Sloane, supra note 22, at 44. 
 44. See id. (―[I]nternational human rights law requires that the deterrent or retributive 
goals to which a focus on the expressive capacity of punishment may contribute be 
tempered and constrained by considerations of due process, rehabilitation, proportionality, 
and justice.‖). 
 45. Id. at 42. 
 46. See SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 46, 48 (―[A] human rights enforcement system 
that is itself not compatible with human rights loses a great deal of impact and 
persuasiveness.  How should one generally rely on and trust in a system that is meant to 
protect human rights but is intrinsically at odds with them? . . . The protection of human 
rights by using criminal law at an international level can only be effective if it is done with 
respect for human rights.‖). 
 47. See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 30 (2000) (―For trials to realize their 
constructive potential, they need to be prosecuted in keeping with the full legality associated 
with working democracies during ordinary times, and when they are not conducted in a 
visibly fair way, the very same trials can backfire, risking the wrong message of political 
justice and threatening a fledgling liberal state.  Accordingly, successor trials walk a 
remarkably thin line between the fulfillment of the potential for a renewed adherence to the 
rule of law and the risk of perpetuating political justice.‖); see also Sonja B. Starr, 
Rethinking “Effective Remedies”:  Remedial Deterrence in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 693, 713 (2008) (arguing that perceived fairness is critical to transitional justice). 
 48. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal 
Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1015 (2007) (discussing transnational networks among 
judges, prosecutors, and investigators and stating that ―[s]ome judges carry lessons learned 
at international tribunals back to their domestic courts‖). 
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domestic jurisdictions are using ICTY procedural rules and case law for 
guidance.49 
Moreover, international procedural rules often migrate from international 
criminal courts to hybrid tribunals50 and eventually to domestic 
jurisdictions.  Among the oft-cited benefits of hybrid tribunals are 
increasing the affected region‘s respect for the rule of law and trust in 
public institutions and building local capacity through collaboration with 
international lawyers.51  If criminal procedures trickle down from 
international tribunals to hybrid courts and hybrid courts to national courts, 
then an international provisional release law that fails to live up to 
international human rights norms may prove problematic.  Release-
unfriendly precedent of the ad hoc tribunals may be justifiable in the 
particular circumstances of international criminal tribunals, but less so in 
domestic courts.  It is far from clear that national jurisdictions will resist 
the temptation to import exceptional international criminal procedures 
despite the absence of these justifications, particularly if the international 
court is not clear about the reasons for its decisions.52   
The same concern about setting a bad example for domestic jurisdictions 
and disseminating human rights-unfriendly laws arises under the 
framework of the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute).  The ICC, 
whose jurisdiction is ―complementary‖ and not ―primary,‖ is premised on 
decentralization—the notion that most states are investigating and trying 
cases locally.53  If countries model their war crimes legislation and 
jurisprudence on those of international tribunals, the exceptional 
provisional release regimes of international tribunals may be imported into 
domestic law.  This importation and possible dilution of the protections of 
domestic law may not be a good thing. 
                                                 
 49. See Starr, supra note 47, at 714 & n.92 (citing examples from Germany, Ireland, 
Canada, and South Africa and noting that the procedures of the Iraqi Special Tribunal that 
tried Saddam Hussein were modeled on those of the ICTY and the ICTR). 
 50. Hybrid tribunals are courts created, often by the United Nations, in cooperation with 
national governments that meld international and domestic legal approaches.  See Bibas & 
Burke-White, supra note 11, at 639 (listing Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Cambodia, East Timor, 
and Bosnia as examples of hybrid tribunals).  
 51. See, e.g., James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring:  Rethinking Hybrid War 
Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 616, 659 (2005) (listing various ―legacies‖ that 
hybrid tribunals create in the countries in which they operate); Laura A. Dickinson, Note, 
The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 295, 305–06 (2003) (discussing the 
advantages of hybrid tribunals). 
 52. See Starr, supra note 47, at 744–45 (discussing the danger of the opacity in 
international judicial decisions in reference to its effect on the understanding of international 
human rights obligations at the national level). 
 53. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity:  The International 
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. 
INT‘L L.J. 53, 56 (2008) (labeling the practice ―passive complementarity‖). 
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The question then becomes what provisional release regime best 
promotes human rights?  A defendant‘s rights-protective provisional 
release regime arguably encourages human rights norms such as the rights 
to be free from arbitrary detention, to a fair trial, to the presumption of 
innocence, to a speedy trial, and the like.  By freeing a defendant pending 
final judgment, the international tribunal expresses a high value, to use 
Sloane‘s language, for these human rights norms.54 
However, some argue that releasing people accused of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes undermines human rights by trivializing 
those offenses and the related human rights norms of right to life, security 
of person, and others.55  In essence, by letting a defendant roam the streets 
while accused of such serious crimes, the court expresses a view that these 
crimes are no more serious than any garden-variety domestic crime, and 
undermines the expressive function of the prosecution.   
There is a risk that letting defendants out on provisional release for 
serious international crimes will create this impression, but the risk can be 
mitigated by other mechanisms showing that the tribunals take these crimes 
very seriously.  The most obvious means of doing this is through 
sentencing.  Once a defendant is convicted, his or her sentence should 
reflect the gravity of the crimes.56  Moreover, outreach can be aimed at 
explaining why defendants are released, the presumption of innocence, and 
defendants‘ rights, while affirming the gravity of the crimes charged.  
Trying to achieve these expressive aims before a defendant is convicted 
puts the cart before the horse and unnecessarily undermines other important 
human rights norms. 
B. Human Rights Implicated by Provisional Release Decisions 
International human rights law does not recognize a right to bail or 
release pending trial.  Rather, it recognizes the right to have a court decide 
the lawfulness of a defendant‘s detention promptly after arrest.57  Detention 
                                                 
 54. Sloane, supra note 22, at 69–70 (arguing for recognition of the expressive function 
of international criminal proceedings). 
 55. See infra notes 267–268 (discussing whether to release defendants for court breaks). 
 56. See Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary 
Crimes, 5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 683, 688–89 (2007) (arguing that sentences at the ICTY have 
been too lenient and advocating for the introduction of sentencing guidelines). 
 57. The ICCPR provides, ―Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention 
shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide 
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not 
lawful.‖  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. III, art. 9(4), opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Prosecutor v. 
Norman, Fofana, & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR65, Appeal Against Decision 
Refusing Bail, ¶ 32 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 11, 2005), 
 http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=gcYjozQ1q9U%3d&tabid=193 (stating that 
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and release of international criminal defendants also implicates a number of 
core human rights, including the presumption of innocence, the rights to 
liberty and to be free from arbitrary detention, and to a speedy and fair trial.  
Detention and release also affect victims‘ rights.   
Decisions about detention and release bring to the fore a key question 
about the relationship between international criminal law and human rights 
law—do the international human rights norms apply in the context of an 
international criminal trial?  I contend that whether or not international 
human rights instruments technically bind international tribunals, the 
tribunals should seek to uphold them in order to achieve their objective of 
promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law. 
1. Presumption of innocence 
All major international human rights instruments58 and the statutes of the 
ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC proclaim the presumption of innocence.59  
For example, Article 6(2) of the ECHR enshrines the presumption of 
innocence: ―Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law.‖60 
According to one leading international criminal law scholar, the 
presumption has three major implications:  
(i) the person charged with a crime must be treated . . . as being innocent 
until proved guilty; (ii) the burden of proof, that the accused is guilty of 
the crimes with which he is charged, is on the Prosecutor; the defendant 
may limit himself to rebutting the evidence produced by the Prosecutor, 
but does not have to prove his innocence; (iii) in order to find the 
accused guilty of the crimes charged, the court must be convinced of his 
guilt according to a certain standard of proof, which in civil law 
                                                 
the ―right to bail‖ is a ―right to apply for bail‖ after which the court can determine whether 
pre-trial detention is necessary). 
 58. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:  
Identifying Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 235, 254–55 (1993) (citing several human rights conventions and 
noting that sixty-seven national constitutions also provide for the presumption of 
innocence).   
 59. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 66(1), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm; Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 20(3), U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (Oct. 1, 2004) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 21(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter 
ICTY Statute], available at 
 http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf; see also 
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 390 (2003) (providing that major 
national legal systems follow the principle of the ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute, and Rome 
Statute and presume innocence). 
 60. ECHR, supra note 23, art. 6(2). 
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countries is normally [the judge‘s innermost conviction] whereas in 




To the extent one believes that the presumption of innocence applies 
more broadly than just to the burden of proof at trial, provisional release 
decisions arguably implicate all three aspects of the presumption.  Indeed, 
discussion of the presumption of innocence appears most frequently in 
international tribunals in the context of provisional release.62   
Regarding the first implication—that the person charged with a crime 
must be treated as being innocent until proven guilty—the significance for 
provisional release is that innocent people should not be detained absent 
strict justifications.63  Moreover, as the ECtHR has stated, ―the gravity of 
                                                 
 61. CASSESE, supra note 59, at 390; see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 85 (listing three 
main consequences of the presumption of innocence).  However, not all domestic 
jurisdictions agree on the scope of the presumption of innocence.  Both the United States 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada have noted the link between the 
presumption of innocence and bail, but the United States Supreme Court increasingly 
appears to have adopted a restrictive interpretation of the presumption of innocence as 
allocating the burden of proof at trial and having ―no application to a determination of the 
rights of a pre-trial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.‖ Compare 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (stating ―[t]he presumption of innocence is a 
doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials . . . [b]ut it has no application to 
a determination of the rights of a pre-trial detainee during confinement before his trial has 
even begun‖ in a case relating to conditions of detention), with Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 
(1951) (stating ―[u]nless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of 
innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning‖).  It bears 
noting that Bell dealt with a class action suit about conditions of confinement for pre-trial 
detainees, not ―with the initial decision to detain an accused and the curtailment of liberty 
that such a decision necessarily entails.‖  Bell, 441 U.S. at 533–34; see also NICO STEYTLER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996 134 (1998) (contending that the right to bail does not 
stem from the presumption of innocence).  By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
noted: ―it is generally accepted and acknowledged that the denial of bail has a detrimental 
effect on the presumption of innocence and liberty rights of the accused . . . .‖  R. v. Hall, 
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 SCC 64, ¶ 59 (Can.); see also R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, 
¶ 24 (Can.) (stating that ―the presumption of innocence is an animating principle throughout 
the criminal justice process.  The fact that it comes to be applied it its strict evidentiary 
sense at trial pursuant to s. 11(d) of the Charter, in no way diminishes the broader principle 
of fundamental justice that the starting point for any proposed deprivation of life, liberty or 
security of the person of anyone charged with or suspected of an offence must be that the 
person is innocent‖); Francois Quintard-Morenas, The Presumption of Innocence in the 
French and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 107, 149 (2010) (noting 
that the French conception of the presumption of innocence is as ―a rule of proof casting on 
the prosecution the burden of proving guilt [as well as] a shield that prevents the infliction 
of punishment prior to conviction;‖ whereas ―Anglo-American jurisdictions tend to view the 
doctrine as a mere rule of proof without effect before trial‖). 
 62. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:  THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 517 (2006).   
 63. See ECHR, supra note 23, art. 5(1) (delineating reasons for lawful deprivation of 
liberty); see also SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 134 (stating that ―[s]een in terms of the 
presumption of innocence, the legitimacy of pre-trial detention [is] called in question, as it 
can be defined as the detention of an innocent‖).  Judge Pettiti in W. v. Switzerland offered 
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the charges cannot by itself serve to justify long periods of detention on 
remand.‖64  Nor can detention be used to ―anticipate the sentence‖ or 
reflect the judge‘s feeling or opinions as regards the accused‘s guilt.65  Also 
related to this aspect of the presumption of innocence is the notion 
embodied in Article 9(3) of the ICCPR that ―[i]t shall not be the general 
rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody.‖66 
Regarding the second implication of the presumption of innocence—the 
allocation of burden of proof—the significance for provisional release is 
less clear.  On the one hand, the decision whether or not to detain a person 
is not a final decision on the merits of the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant.  However, to the extent one ties the possibility of release to the 
likelihood that the defendant committed the offense,67 arguably the 
presumption of innocence requires that the defendant not have to prove his 
or her innocence to get released.  A stronger formulation is that the 
defendant should not bear the burden of proving anything, including the 
absence of flight risk or danger for the provisional release inquiry.68  
                                                 
an even more defendant-friendly interpretation of the presumption.  He contended that it 
also is to ―mak[e] it possible for a defendant to cope with his position as an accused until his 
trial.  As an extreme case, a person who knows he is guilty must be able, by remaining at 
liberty after being charged, to orientate his professional and family life and make 
arrangements for the future.‖  W. v. Switzerland, 254 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5, 22 (1993) 
(Pettiti, J., dissenting). 
 64. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for 
Provisional Release During the Court‘s Winter Recess, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/081217.pdf (quoting Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, 
[citation omitted]); see also Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, 
Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 46 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 26, 
2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf  
(stating that the ECtHR has held that the gravity of the charges is not sufficient justification 
for long periods of detention on remand); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case 
No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision on Ramush Haradinaj‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 24 
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 6, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/050606.htm (same); Prosecutor v. Franko 
Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-AR65.2, Decision on Prosecution‘s Appeal Against Decision 
on Provisional Release, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 3, 2004), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/acdec/en/041203sim.htm.   
 65. See Smirnova v. Russia, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 249; Tomasi v. France, App. 
No. 12850/87, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 51 (1992); Letellier v. France, 207 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
at 21, ¶ 51 (1991) (same).  
 66. SCHABAS, supra note 62, at 517.  Safferling contends that the requirement that 
liberty be the general rule and jail the exception is the ―logical and consistent adaptation of 
the principle of presumption of innocence to the pre-trial stage.‖  SAFFERLING, supra note 
41, at 135.  In juxtaposition to the old rule at the ad hoc tribunals requiring ―exceptional 
circumstances‖ to justify release, Safferling argues that ―[o]nly under exceptional 
circumstances may a suspect be detained; otherwise he must remain free.‖  Id. 
 67. See SCHABAS, supra note 62, at 517. 
 68. See, e.g., ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 85 (stating that the prosecutor should bear the 
burden of proof).  
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The ECtHR has stated that the burden of proof must be on the 
prosecution, not the defense, to establish grounds for detention, since 
―[s]hifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is 
tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the [ECHR], a provision 
which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty 
and one that is only permissible in exhaustively and strictly defined 
cases.‖69  Although, as Patricia Wald and Jenny Martinez note, it is 
common for domestic jurisdictions to have presumptions of risk or danger 
when a defendant is accused of certain serious offenses,70 and international 
crimes are undoubtedly extremely serious offenses,71 these presumptions 
are rebuttable, and the prosecution typically still bears the burden of 
persuading the court that the defendant is a risk of flight or danger.72  
Presumption of innocence notwithstanding, some domestic courts appear 
to allow the strength of a case against an accused to be factored into the 
provisional release decision.  In the United States federal system, in certain 
serious cases where there is a presumption of risk of flight or danger, ―the 
weight of the evidence‖ is one of the factors a judge is to take into account 
in deciding release.73  Similarly, in Canada, the strength of the 
                                                 
 69. Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 85 (2001). 
 70. WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 234 n.11; see also R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 
S.C.R. 665, ¶ 33 (Can.) (upholding a law placing the burden on those charged with drug 
trafficking to show why they should not be detained).  
 71. WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 234. 
 72. The ECtHR has not banned presumptions of risks of flight or danger altogether, but 
it limits them by stating, ―[w]here the law provides for a presumption in respect of factors 
relevant to the grounds for continued detention, the existence of concrete facts outweighing 
the rule of respect for individual liberty must be nevertheless convincingly demonstrated.‖  
Ilijkov, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 84 (2001) (internal citations omitted).  In Ilijkov, the ECtHR 
found a violation of the ECHR in a case where Bulgarian courts failed to examine the 
circumstances that may have weighed against the danger that the accused would abscond or 
collude with others based on a strict presumption of detention that was ―only rebuttable in 
very exceptional circumstances where even a hypothetical possibility of absconding, re-
offending or collusion was excluded due to serious illness or other exceptional factors.‖  Id. 
at ¶ 83.  Likewise, in the United States federal system, even in certain serious cases where 
there is a presumption of flight or danger, the defendant only bears the burden of producing 
evidence—not of persuading the fact-finder—that he does not pose a danger to the 
community or risk of flight.  The burden of persuasion remains on the government to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is dangerous or by a preponderance of 
the evidence that he or she poses a flight risk.  United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 
(2d Cir. 2001); see also  
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (2006) (requiring the government to prove that the defendant 
poses a serious risk of obstruction of justice).  But see R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, ¶ 
33 (Can.) (holding that it did not violate the presumption of innocence for the defendant to 
bear burden of showing why he or she should be released). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2); see also Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventive Detention:  A 
Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices in the United States, England, Canada and Other 
Common Law Nations, 8 PACE INT‘L L. REV. 399, 410 n.60 (1996) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(g)). 
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prosecution‘s case can be relevant to the release inquiry.74  By contrast, 
ECtHR jurisprudence makes reasonable suspicion a sine qua non for 
detention, but the case for detention does not vary depending on the 
strength of the evidence against the accused.  Likewise, in the United 
Kingdom, the likelihood of conviction has been deemed irrelevant to the 
bail inquiry since 1976.75 
Finally, the third implication of the presumption of innocence—the 
standard of proof— begs the question how much the standard of proof on 
release factors, particularly if one such factor is the likelihood of 
conviction, can deviate from the ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ or 
―innermost conviction of the judge‖ standard ultimately used to assess guilt 
or innocence.  At the ICTY, the defense bears the burden of proving, on a 
balance of probabilities, that the accused will appear for trial and will not 
pose a danger if released.76 
Despite the scholarly debate on when the presumption should kick in,77 
there is little discussion whether the presumption abates as damning 
evidence comes in.  If the presumption is strongest against those who have 
not been indicted, is it weaker against those against whom more than a 
prima facie case exists?  The language of the international criminal statutes, 
human rights instruments, and ECtHR cases suggests otherwise.  One is 
presumed innocent until conviction.78  Nevertheless, as discussed below, 
the ICTY‘s heightened release standard after the prosecution has rested 
raises the possible inference that courts view the presumption of innocence 
as weakening as more evidence comes in against an accused, even if they 
                                                 
 74. See R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 SCC 64, ¶ 40 (Can.) (applying four 
factors set out in Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46 § 515(10)(c), used to 
determine whether bail can be denied). 
 75. See Metzmeier, supra note 73, at 413–15 (explaining the English system of bail). 
 76. E.g., Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion 
for Provisional Release, ¶ 12 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/100331.pdf. 
 77. Compare ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 84 (advocating the early application of the 
presumption at least as of investigation), and C. Van den Wyngaert, Criminal Procedure in 
Belgium, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,  15 (C. Van den 
Wyngaert, ed., 1993) (stating that Article 6(2) of the ECHR on the presumption of 
innocence is applicable throughout all stages of the proceedings), with SAFFERLING, supra 
note 41, at 67 (questioning whether the presumption of innocence is even applicable pre-
trial).   
 78. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. III, art. 14(2), 
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (―Everyone charged with a criminal 
offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.‖); 
Neumeister v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37, ¶ 4 (1968) (discussing Article 5(3) of 
the ECHR and stating ―[u]ntil conviction, [an accused] must be presumed innocent, and the 
purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release 
once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable‖); ICTY Statute, supra note 59,  art. 
21(3) (―The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the 
provisions of the present Statute.‖). 
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seek to characterize the relevance of the evidence as the increased flight 
risk of the defendant.79  
ICTY judges appear to consider the presumption relevant to the 
provisional release inquiry, but not determinative.  As ICTY Judge 
Robinson noted in Prosecutor v. Jokic,80 ―as a general rule, a decision to 
release an accused should be based on an assessment of whether public 
interest requirements, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, 
outweigh the need to ensure, for an accused, respect to the right to liberty 
of person.‖81  Another chamber has noted that ICTY jurisprudence 
considers the presumption of innocence not to be determinative on the issue 
of release ―since otherwise . . . ‗no accused would ever be detained, as all 
are presumed innocent.‘‖82 
2. The right to liberty and security of the person 
Detention or arrest is also a ―severe infringement of the right to liberty 
and security of person‖ guaranteed in Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 
of the ECHR.83  Article 9 of the ICCPR also forbids ―arbitrary arrest or 
detention.‖84 
Of course, these rights are not absolute.  The guarantee that ―[n]o one 
shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by law‖85 makes clear that some 
grounds for detaining people exist, notwithstanding the right, and the issue 
is over the legality of the grounds on which they are detained and the 
                                                 
 79. See infra Part II.C. 
 80. Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Order on Motions for Provisional Release, ¶ 20 (Int‘l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002). 
 81. Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the 
Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic, ¶ 14 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm  
(―The Trial Chamber has carefully balanced two main factors, namely the public interest, 
including the interest of the victims and witnesses who have agreed to co-operate with the 
Prosecution, and the right of all detainees to be treated in a humane manner in accordance 
with the fundamental principles of respect for their inherent dignity and of the presumption 
of innocence.‖). 
 82. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87-AR65.2, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal of Denial of Provisional Release During the Winter Recess, ¶ 12 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 2006).  At least one ICTY Trial Chamber 
has found that ―there is no right of an accused to provisional release during the court recess 
derived from the presumption of innocence; rather, subject to the requirements of Rule 
65(B) being met, it is based on judicial discretion.‖  Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-
81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for Provisional Release During the Court‘s Winter 
Recess, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/081217.pdf. 
 83. SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 133. 
 84. ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 9(1). 
 85. Id. 
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procedures allowing for detention.  As noted below, the ECtHR demands 
that ―a genuine public requirement of public interest‖ outweigh the 
individual‘s liberty interest.86   
Domestic jurisdictions also require a balancing of the right of the 
individual to liberty against the interests of the state in provisional release 
decisions.  The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of 
Canada have held that the government can constitutionally restrict a 
person‘s liberty if there is a permissive regulatory purpose, such as 
ensuring the defendant‘s presence at trial or ―preventing danger to the 
community,‖ and the measure is not excessive.87  In Germany, the notion is 
that detention requires justification because it deprives a person of his right 
to freedom of movement.88  If the needs of society outweigh the rights of 
the defendant, the defendant, though presumed innocent, must make a 
―‗special sacrifice‘ (Sonderopfer)‖ for the good of the community.89 
Although the interests of the state may outweigh those of a detainee in 
certain circumstances, judges should not have boundless discretion in 
detaining criminal defendants.  In Schiesser v. Switzerland,90 the ECtHR 
held that, to comport with Article 5(3), the official determining release or 
detention must ―review[] the circumstances militating for or against 
detention, [and] decid[e], by reference to legal criteria, whether there are 
reasons to justify detention and . . . order[] release if there are no such 
reasons.‖91  Likewise, in upholding the Bail Reform Act‘s provision 
allowing for detention based on danger to the community, the United States 
Supreme Court found it significant that the provision did not give ―[t]he 
judicial officer . . . unbridled discretion in making the detention 
determination‖ since ―Congress ha[d] specified the considerations relevant 
to that decision.‖92  The Supreme Court of Canada struck down provisional 
release provisions that gave courts too much discretion on the basis that 
                                                 
 86. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 87. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744 (1987); see also R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 
S.C.R. 665, ¶ 4 (Can.) (upholding the bail act‘s presumption of detention in drug 
distribution cases based on the narrowness of the circumstances that justified detention and 
the finding that detention was necessary for the proper functioning of the bail system). 
 88. SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 134 (―Detention means that the suspect is deprived of 
his right to freedom of movement (outside his cell) for the duration of detention.  It is not 
merely a violation of the human rights to liberty, but a temporary destruction of this right.‖). 
 89. Id. 
 90. 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14, ¶ 31 (1979) 
 91. Id.; see also Skoogstrom v. Sweden, 83 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, ¶¶ 82–83 
(1984) (noting that the breadth of Sweden‘s public prosecutor‘s discretion in deciding 
release might not meet the ―by reference to legal criteria‖ requirement). 
 92. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742.  The factors included ―the nature and seriousness of the 
charges, the substantiality of the  
Government‘s evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee‘s background and characteristics, 
and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect‘s release.‖  Id. at 742–43. 
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―[a]ny bail provision that confers open-ended judicial discretion to refuse 
bail is unconstitutional, and it is a fundamental principle of justice that an 
individual cannot be detained by virtue of a vague legal provision.‖93  
Both the ICCPR and the ECHR provide that those who have been 
unlawfully arrested or detained have an enforceable right to 
compensation.94  Likewise, many European jurisdictions provide for 
compensation for unlawful detention.95  Some European jurisdictions even 
provide compensation to criminal defendants who are acquitted, even if 
their detention was lawful.96  By contrast, public compensation for 
detention is uncommon in the United States, and tort actions for malicious 
prosecution or false imprisonment are unlikely to succeed.97 
3. The right to a speedy trial 
Although the right to a speedy trial is tied to the right to be free from 
arbitrary detention and the presumption of innocence, it has also been 
recognized as a human right ―found to be basic to fairness in the criminal 
process,‖ both as part of the concept of due process and ―as a separate, 
indentifiable [sic] right.‖98   
Significantly for provisional release, the ICCPR and the ECHR provide 
that the remedy for failure to decide charges expeditiously is release.  For 
example, Article 5(3) of the ECHR provides:  
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 1.c of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or 
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
                                                 
 93. R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, ¶ 12, 2002 SCC 64 (Can.).  The Supreme Court of 
Canada has struck down provisions allowing courts to deny bail when it was ―necessary in 
the public interest,‖ R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, ¶ 4 (Can.), and ―on any other just 
cause being shown‖ as unconstitutionally vague, R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, ¶ 18 
(Can.).  As the court stated in R. v. Pearson, ―discretion is arbitrary if there are no criteria, 
express or implied, which govern its exercise . . . . Thus, detention is arbitrary if it is 
governed by unstructured discretion.‖  [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, ¶ 70 (Can.) (quoting R. v. 
Hufsky, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 621, ¶ 5 (Can.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94. See ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 9(5) (―Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful 
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.‖); ECHR, supra note 23, 
art. 5(5) (―Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.‖). 
 95. See Richard S. Frase, Main-Streaming Comparative Criminal Justice:  How to 
Incorporate Comparative and International Concepts and Materials into Basic Criminal 
Law and Procedure Courses, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 773, 782 (1998) (citing various European 
codes requiring compensation be paid to defendants held in pretrial detention but never 
convicted). 
 96. See Johan David Michels, Compensating Acquitted Defendants For Detention 
Before International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 407, 409 n.6 (2010) (listing 
Norway, Sweden, Demark, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Iceland, Italy and Latvia, 
among others, as countries providing compensation). 
 97. Frase, supra, note 95, at 782. 
 98. Bassiouni, supra note 58, at 253, 274. 
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entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.  
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
99
 
The ICCPR provision is almost identical.
100
  The United States views the 
right to be tried within a reasonable time in speedy trial terms and envisions 
an even more drastic remedy, dismissal of the charges with prejudice, as 
the ordinary remedy for the violation of this right.101 
Article 5(3) has been the focal point of ECtHR cases where litigants 
claim that their governments have violated their rights under the ECHR 
based on excessive detention prior to a final judgment.  The ECtHR has 
held that Article 5(3)‘s right to be tried within a reasonable time or to be 
released applies ―until the day of the judgment that terminates the trial.‖102   
The ECtHR engages in a three-step analysis to assess the legitimacy of 
detention under Article 5(3).  The inquiry under the ECHR is first, whether 
there is reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed a crime to 
support the detention.103  Even if there is reasonable suspicion, continued 
detention is not acceptable unless the government shows ―relevant‖ and 
―sufficient‖ grounds to justify the detention.104  Even then, detention may 
become unreasonable under Article 5(3) if authorities fail to act with 
―special diligence‖ or if the proceedings go on too long.105  
To determine whether detention on remand (or denial of release) is 
permissible, despite the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence, 
the ECtHR uses a balancing test:  
―Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are 
specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, 
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of 
                                                 
 99. ECHR, supra note 23, art. 5(3) (emphasis added).   
 100. See ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 9(3) (―Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal 
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.  It 
shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but 
release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial 
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.‖). 
 101. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439–40 (1973) (contemplating 
alternative remedies, but concluding that dismissal must remain ―the only possible 
remedy‖). 
 102. Wemhoff v. Germany, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23, ¶ 7 (1968). 
 103. See Tomasi v. France, App. No. 12850/87, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 49–50 (1982) 
(holding that France had violated Tomasi‘s rights under Article 5(3) of the ECHR).   
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 50; see also Debboub alias Husseini Ali v. France, App. No. 37786/97,  
33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1302, 1314 (2001) (acknowledging the complexity of the case but finding 
that the French courts had not acted with the necessary dispatch); Wemhoff,  
7 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26 (noting that Article 5(3) may be violated if proceedings go on too long 
even if a person is otherwise reasonably detained, but finding, in the very same case, that the 
exceptional length of the investigation and the trial, a total of three years, were justified due 
to the exceptional complexity of the case). 
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respect for individual liberty.‖106  The ECtHR has recognized four 
permissible grounds for refusing provisional release—the risk that, if 
released, the defendant ―will fail to appear at trial,‖ ―take action to 
prejudice the administration of justice,‖ commit further crimes, or ―cause 
public disorder.‖107  Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that detaining criminal defendants based on risk of flight or danger to the 
community does not offend any constitutional rights to liberty, due process, 
or bail.108  As discussed below in Parts II and III, the ICTY rules have tied 
release to two of these grounds—risk of flight and danger—and the ICC 
rules to three—risk of flight, further offenses, and the obstruction of 
justice.109 
In addition to the guarantee of Article 5(3) discussed above in Part I.B.3, 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR provides: ―In the determination of his civil rights 
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.‖110  This right applies whether or not 
the defendant is detained.  The ECtHR interprets the right to speedy trial to 
include the right for one‘s trial to be completed expeditiously, not just that 
trial begins within a reasonable time.111 
                                                 
 106. W. v. Switzerland, 254 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1993).  
 107. Smirnova v. Russia, App. Nos. 46138/99 and 48183/99, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 450, 461 
(2004).   
 108. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 739 (1987).  At the time of Salerno, 
detaining criminal defendants based on future danger was highly controversial and drew 
vigorous dissents.  In particular, Justice Marshall argued that it violated the presumption of 
innocence.  Id. at 762–63 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also DANIEL RICHMAN, United 
States v. Salerno:  The Constitutionality of Regulatory Detention, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
STORIES 413, 413, 439 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (noting the controversy over the future 
danger ground and that it has since died down); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing 
Dangerousness:  Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice,  
114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1454 (2001) (arguing that prevention and justice ought to be 
separated). 
 109. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a Cambodian 
court with international participation set up to address the crimes of the Khmer Rouge 
regime, relies upon the fourth ground for detention, preservation of the ―public order,‖ 
which I discuss in another work in progress. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia Internal Rules, Rule 63(3) (Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter ECCC Rules], available at  
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/121/IRv5-EN.pdf.  See generally About 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia:  Introduction, 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/about_eccc.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).  
 110. ECHR, supra note 23, art. 6(1). 
 111. Wemhoff v. Germany, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1968) (resolving an ambiguity 
in the English text of the ECHR and holding that Article 5(3)‘s right to be tried within a 
reasonable time or to be released applies ―until the day of the judgement that terminates the 
trial‖). 
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4. The right to a fair trial 
The right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is one of the core human 
rights guaranteed in international human rights instruments, including the 
ICCPR, the ECHR and others.112  It encompasses a variety of procedural 
concepts, such as a defendant‘s right to have his or her case adjudicated by 
an impartial court.113  In addition, it includes moral concepts, such as the 
presumption of innocence, right to liberty, and security of the person, 
which are discussed above.114  It also includes the right for a defendant to 
be allowed a fair opportunity to defend himself or herself against 
charges.115 
As scholars, the ECtHR, and the Supreme Court of Canada have noted, 
detention on remand also presents a number of difficulties for defendants, 
including interfering with defense preparation, economic hardship, and 
pressure to plead guilty.116  Empirical studies suggest that ―the longer a 
person spends time in pretrial detention, the more likely she will be 
convicted.‖117 
                                                 
 112. SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 29. 
 113. Id. at 30. 
 114. Id. at 30–31 (―[T]he texts of the human rights treaties, Art. 14 ICCPR in particular, 
[make clear] that ‗fair trial‘ does not comprise one peculiar right.  It consists of a whole 
range of different rights and obligations.  Nevertheless it is one concept:  how to make a trial 
‗fair.‘‖). 
 115. See Salov v. Ukraine, 2005-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 143, 169 (―Article 6 of the 
Convention, read as a whole, guarantees the right of an accused to participate effectively in 
a criminal trial.  It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal 
proceedings, including the elements of such proceedings which relate to procedure, should 
be adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution and 
defence.  In deciding whether there has been a violation of Article 6, the Court must 
consider whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the appeal proceedings, as well 
as the way in which evidence was taken, were fair.‖ (internal citations omitted)). 
 116. See, e.g., R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, ¶ 59, 2002 SCC 64 (Can.) (Iacobucci, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Packer and noting that a Toronto empirical study conducted by 
Professor Friedland had demonstrated these prejudicial effects); W. v. Switzerland, 254 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1993) (Pettiti, J., dissenting) (noting that the ―perverse effects of 
prolonged pre-trial detention‖ include the transformation of an ―investigation into a coercion 
to confess or a punishment for refusing to accuse oneself‖ and the harm to a defendant‘s 
well-being which has led to suicides or early deaths due to illness); id. at 27 (Walsh, J., and 
Loizou, J., dissenting) (stating ―[i]t would be difficult to overemphasise the stark 
consequences of refusing provisional liberty pending trial to the person who is accused of a 
crime (of which he is presumed to be innocent).  He will most probably lose his 
employment, possibly lose his dwelling place, his family‘s life can be totally disrupted and 
driven to penury, and even his marriage may be driven to point of breakdown.  A person 
presumed to be innocent cannot in justice be exposed to such terrible consequences unless 
the reasons for so doing completely outweigh all other considerations.‖); H. L. PACKER, THE 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 214–15 (1968); Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings:  A 
Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1947–48 
(2005). 
 117. Manns, supra note 116, at 1972.   
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These concerns also apply to international criminal defendants.  Like 
defense attorneys in domestic jurisdictions whose clients are in jail, defense 
attorneys at the ICTY spend a great deal of time getting in and out of the 
UNDU to visit their clients.118  In addition, if counsel or investigators are 
conducting investigations in the former Yugoslavia, communicating with 
their clients detained in The Hague can be difficult.  Thus far, the tribunal 
has not recognized this difficulty as a sufficient reason for provisional 
release even where there is no risk of flight or danger.119  Detention in The 
Hague interferes with a defendant‘s ability to make a living, much as 
detention in a domestic jurisdiction does.  However, since international 
defendants are likely to face stiff sentences upon conviction even with a 
guilty plea, there may be less pressure to plead guilty to do the time and get 
on with their lives than in many cases in domestic jurisdictions. 
Another aspect of the right to a fair trial implicated by provisional 
release is the fairness and transparency of the process by which detention 
or release is decided.  Arbitrary detention is unfair to defendants, 
independent of the potential prejudice a defendant‘s detention may have for 
his defense.  Further, the transparency of the process and the criteria by 
which release or detention is decided is critical.  As Professor Diane Marie 
Amann has put it, ―[t]ransparency helps to assure that decisions will be 
both fair and seen as fair.‖120 
5. The rights of victims to protection and participation 
Finally, decisions on provisional release also implicate victims‘ rights, 
which are increasingly being recognized as a part of the human rights 
picture.121  The past fifty years have seen the emergence of a powerful 
movement known as the victims‘ rights movement122 that has impacted 
both the domestic123 and international spheres.124  
                                                 
 118. Telephone Interview with Norm Sepenuk, Defense Counsel, ICTY (Sept. 14, 2009). 
 119. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Cermak, & Markac, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on 
Motion for Provisional Release of Ivan Cermak, ¶¶ 10–11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 14, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tdec/en/080214b.pdf (finding that Cermak had met 
the statutory requirements for provisional release, but exercising its discretion to deny 
release and finding that ―the mere fact that communication between Counsel and the 
Accused would be facilitated if they both were in Croatia at the same time, is not a sufficient 
reason for provisional release‖). 
 120. Diane Marie Amann, Impartiality Deficit and International Criminal Judging, in 
ATROCITIES AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY:  BEYOND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 208, 
214–15 (Edel Hughes et al. eds., 2007). 
 121. See JONATHAN DOAK, VICTIM‘S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  
RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES 29–32 (2008) (discussing ―the cross-fertilisation 
that is occurring between victimology and human rights‖ and the widespread recognition 
that the two are closely linked). 
 122. See id. at 8–9 (providing a chronology of groups and individuals involved in 
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Although the victims‘ rights movement has gained force, it has many 
opponents even within the human rights movement.  In jurisdictions where 
victims have no counsel, some argue that making prosecutors focus on the 
interests of victims undermines the traditional role of the prosecutor as a 
minister of justice.125  Others voice concerns that the victims‘ rights 
movement undermines the presumption of innocence.126  Arguably, giving 
a person the status of victim before a conviction presumes the defendant 
guilty.127   
The central pillars of the victims‘ rights movement are: protection, 
participation, remedy, truth, reconciliation, and reparation.128  These pillars 
receive varying degrees of international support.129  The ICCPR and the 
ECHR recognize victims‘ rights to protection and to an effective remedy130 
but do not recognize a right to participate in criminal proceedings.131  As 
                                                 
campaigning for victim-specific issues). 
 123. See, e.g., Susanne Walther, Victims’ Rights in the German Court System, 19 FED. 
SENT‘G REP. 113, 113 (2006) (describing the transformation in the German court system that 
has brought the victim more and more into play as a ―third party‖ in his or her own right); 
Sierra Elizabeth, Comment, The Newest Spectator Sport:  Why Extending Victims’ Rights to 
the Spectators’ Gallery Erodes the Presumption of Innocence, 58 DUKE L.J. 275, 286 (2008) 
(noting that in the United States all fifty states and the federal government have enacted 
victims‘ rights statutes).  See generally KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS‘ RIGHTS:  
THE NEW LAW AND POLITICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1999) (discussing the emergence of 
victims‘ rights as a powerful force in Canadian criminal justice after 1980). 
 124. See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Rights to Truth 
and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1399, 1399 (2002) 
(advocating for victim-centered prosecutions as a response to mass atrocities); M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’ Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 203 
(2006) (discussing the development of victims‘ rights in domestic and international legal 
systems, in particular the adoption of two international instruments:  the 1985 Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and the 2006 Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law).  See generally DOAK, supra note 121 (drawing from both international 
human rights and domestic criminal justice discourses). 
 125. See, e.g., Erin C. Blondel, Victims’ Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 
237, 273 (2008) (highlighting the conflict between the adversarial process and third-party 
interests). 
 126. See Elizabeth, supra note 123, at 277 n.8 (citing scholars who view victim 
involvement as problematic to the procedural protections of defendants).  
 127. Id. 
 128. See DOAK, supra note 121, at 243 (enumerating values that he contends any modern 
criminal justice system ought to support); see also Aldana-Pindell, supra note 124, at 1405. 
 129. See DOAK, supra note 121, at 243 (explaining that there is considerable unity 
around the values of protection and remedy, but that other values are considerably more 
contentious). 
 130. Aldana-Pindell, supra note 124, at 1419–20.  I am unaware of any case in which 
victims have brought a claim under the ECHR for a violation of their right to protection 
based on a defendant‘s release. 
 131. See DOAK, supra note 121, at 149 (recounting the sole ECHR case to address the 
right to participate, in which the European Commission of Human Rights found no violation 
of the ECHR where the mother of a murder victim complained that she had been denied the 
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one scholar described it, victims‘ rights to participate in the criminal 
process are controversial and ―any such ‗right‘ [is] still very much in the 
developmental stage.‖132 
To fulfill the obligation to protect victims in the provisional release 
context, courts must consider the safety of victims when criminal 
defendants are released.  It seems that the ―danger‖ or future crimes prong 
of the provisional release inquiry, present at both the ICTY and the ICC, is 
oriented towards this aim.133   
The more controversial issue is whether victims have a right to 
participate in release decisions.  The victims‘ rights movement contends 
that excluding victims from the criminal process is unjust because victims 
have an interest in the proceedings and therefore have a right to have their 
interest represented.134  However, since victims are unlikely to advocate for 
provisional release of a defendant, many defendants‘ rights advocates 
question the propriety of their participation in release decisions.  Lynne 
Henderson has argued that in the United States, the victims‘ rights 
movement has accelerated the acceptance of preventive detention for 
criminal defendants.135  The argument for detention is that letting the 
defendant out leaves the victim wondering whether there is ―any justice in 
this world.‖136  Henderson contends that this thinking is understandable, but 
personal frustration of victims does not justify punishment before guilt is 
established.137   
Similarly, in the international sphere, scholars contend that 
solicitousness to victims‘ rights often comes at the price of the rights of 
defendants.  Professor Amann labels the problem the ―impartiality deficit,‖ 
meaning that the tribunals have ―lost sight of the individuals on whom 
suspicion has settled.‖138  As Professors Danner and Martinez have argued, 
the ―victim-oriented, civil law model of human rights‖ produces a 
disproportionate ―concern for symbolic vindication of violations of 
                                                 
right to be involved in the sentencing process); see also ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 2 
(excluding any such right). 
 132. DOAK, supra note 121, at 33. 
 133. See infra Part II.B. 
 134. See Blondel, supra note 125, at 239 (disagreeing that victims‘ rights justify 
changing the adversary system). 
 135. Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims’ Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 969–70 
(1985). 
 136. Id. at 971. 
 137. Id. at 972. 
 138. AMANN, supra note 120, at 209; see also Diane Marie Amann, Saddam Hussein and 
the Impartiality Deficit in International Criminal Justice 4 (working paper Sept. 24, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=813249) (noting that a critique of the impartiality 
deficit in international criminal justice should explore issues such as the validity and 
circumstances of detention). 
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victims‘ human rights‖ and ―has proven a more potent influence than 
worries over potential violations of defendants‘ rights.‖139   
Scholars have voiced concerns over victim participation rights in the 
context of release decisions at international tribunals.  Professor Jenia 
Iontcheva Turner argues that the decision of the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to allow victims to participate in appeals 
of release decisions embodies the ideals of the restorative justice at the 
expense of defendants‘ rights.140  Others have argued that the involvement 
of civil parties at such an early stage of the case ―could slow down the 
proceedings, place an unjust burden on the defense to respond to a 
multiplicity of opponents, and risk injecting irrelevant and potentially 
prejudicial material into the proceedings‖141 and that the victims‘ natural 
bias against the charged person and interest in securing a conviction 
prevents them from having the ―sober and objective view on the suspect‖ 
necessary for a fair decision on detention.142  Moreover, as Turner points 
out, the issue raises a conflict between victims‘ right to participation and 
defendants‘ rights to the presumption of innocence.143   
C. The Human Rights of International Criminal Defendants 
Arguably, international human rights norms do not bind international 
tribunals and therefore should not constrain tribunals in making their 
                                                 
 139. Alison Marston Danner & Jenny Martinez, Guilty Associations:  Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law,  
93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 146 (2005); see also Damaska, supra note 22, at 333 (noting ―the rocky 
relationship between the desire to be solicitous of the accused‘s procedural rights and the 
desire to provide satisfaction to victims of international crime‖); Gregory S. Gordon, 
Toward an International Criminal Procedure:  Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 635, 698 (2007) (arguing that respect for the rights of a defendant 
requires a ―neutral, dispassionate setting‖).  But see DOAK, supra note 121, at 247–48 
(arguing that one need not be too concerned about instances where defendants‘ and victims‘ 
rights may conflict and that by placing victims‘ rights within the human rights framework, it 
gives courts a way of weighing the competing rights). 
 140. Turner, supra note 318, at 120.  
 141. Id. at 119 (citing Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ 
(PTC01), Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals 
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Mar. 20, 2008), 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/53/PTC_decision_civil_party_nuon_chea
_C11_53_EN.pdf) at ¶ 11(vii); see also Prosecutor v. Nuon, Ieng, Ieng, & Khieu, Case No. 
002/19-09-2007-ECCC/PTC, Joint and Several Submissions on Civil-Party Participation in 
Appeals Related to Provisional Detention, ¶¶ 28–29 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of 
Cambodia Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://www.cambodiatribunal.org. 
 142. Prof. Christoph Safferling Amicus Curiae concerning Criminal Case File No. 
002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01) at 7, Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-
ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01) (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Feb. 22, 2008) 
[hereinafter Safferling Amicus Brief], 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/38/Amicus_Christoph_Safferling_C11_3
9_EN.pdf. 
 143. Turner, supra note 140, at 121.   
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provisional release decisions.  Not all rights are binding or enforceable in 
the first place.144  Even where rights are binding on states, international 
tribunals may still be off the hook.  Human rights instruments, such as the 
ICCPR, the ECHR, and the African Charter for Human Rights, all were 
designed with domestic, not international, jurisdictions in mind—a state 
shall not deprive a person of certain rights.145 
International tribunals have sidestepped human rights norms before.  
Most famously, the Nuremburg tribunal is said to have violated the rule of 
―nullum crimen sine lege‖ (no crime without preexisting law) in 
prosecuting defendants for crimes against humanity and aggression, crimes 
that had never before been defined in international or domestic law.146  
Similarly, in deciding the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the first 
defendant before the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber deemed the international 
human rights norm that those charged with crimes have a right to a ―fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law‖147 inapplicable to international tribunals.148 
However, the gravity of the crimes alone does not justify a departure 
from human rights norms.  The European Commission for Human Rights 
(Commission) has found that the ECHR‘s right to be tried within a 
reasonable time or released still applied to defendants charged with crimes 
                                                 
 144. See Bassiouni, supra note 58, at 242 (―They must therefore be considered 
individually as well as cumulatively to determine whether there is an obligation by a state to 
conform to the requirements of those rights.‖).  There are three types of binding legal 
norms: ―convention or treaty; a general or particular international custom (as evidenced by 
consistent practice and opinio juris); and a general principle of law (as evidenced by other 
perfected and unperfected sources of international law or by principles derived from the 
major legal systems of the world.‖  Id.  Although it is likely an uphill battle in the peacetime 
circumstances of most international tribunals, there arguably is a question whether 
derogation from such a principle is warranted in the context of international criminal 
tribunals.  Id. at 252. 
 145. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 42 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm; see also Starr, supra note 
47, at 700 (―Human rights law . . . governs the relations between states and individuals.‖). 
 146. See Padmanabhan, supra note 42, at 442 & n.45 (noting that Nazi and Japanese 
officials were tried for the crime of aggression even though it was not a crime at that time). 
 147. ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 14(1) (emphasis added); see also Organization of 
American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (granting every person the ―right to a hearing, with 
due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial 
tribunal, previously established by law‖); ECHR, supra note 23, art. 6(1) (stating also that 
―everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law‖). 
 148. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 42 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm.  The Appeals Chamber 
nevertheless concluded that the ICTY had been ―established by law‖ in the sense that it was 
established in accordance with the rule of law.  Id. 
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against humanity.149  In Jentzsch v. Germany,150 the Commission examined 
Jentzsch‘s claim of unreasonable detention during the investigation and 
prosecution of his trial for his ―active[] participat[ion] in the so-called 
‗death bath‘ operations in the Gusen concentration camp.‖151  Despite 
finding the norm against unreasonable detention applicable, the 
Commission considered the special features of the case, including the 
potential life sentence, the great number of witnesses and suspects 
involved, and the fact that the crime occurred outside of Germany, in 
assessing the diligence of the German authorities and found no violation of 
Article 5(3) of the ECHR, despite detention of some six years pre-trial, 
over a year at trial and two years during appellate proceedings.152   
ICTY judges seem to be conflicted on the applicability of human rights 
law, at least as expressed by the ECtHR, to their provisional release 
decisions.153  Noting some of the special features of international tribunals 
discussed below, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic154 
explained that ―care should be taken that too great a reliance is not placed 
upon [the decisions of the ECHR and the Commission] as defining what is 
a reasonable length of pre-trial detention in an international criminal court 
or tribunal rather than in particular domestic jurisdictions in Europe.‖155  
The court emphasized that it must consider the circumstances in which the 
tribunal must operate in assessing what is a reasonable length of pre-trial 
detention at the ICTY.156 
Other ICTY chambers seem less inclined to take provisional release at 
international tribunals out of the realm of human rights law.  In Prosecutor 
                                                 
 149. See Jentzsch v. Germany, App. No. 2604/65, 1971 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 14, ¶¶ 
10–11 (Eur. Comm‘n on H.R.); see also SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 145 n.481 (citing 
Jentzsch and noting that, in Jentzsch, the Commission nevertheless found no violation of the 
right to be tried within a reasonable time due to the special circumstances of the case).   
 150. 1971 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 14, ¶¶ 10–11. 
 151. Id. 
 152. SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 145 n.481; see also Jentzsch v. Germany, 1971 Y.B. 
Eur. Conv. on H.R. 14, ¶ 171  (Eur. Comm‘n on H.R.); Rosenbaum v. Germany, App. No. 
3376/67, Eur. Comm‘n on H.R. Dec. & Rep. 29, 31–49, (1969) (finding that the length of 
detention on remand of six years and eleven months alone did not violate Article 5(3)). 
 153. See supra note 24 (providing examples where ICTY judges were split on whether 
the ECtHR law binds the Tribunal). 
 154. Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Motion by Radoslav Brdanin for Provisional 
Release, ¶ 26 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 25, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/00725PR213239.htm. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at ¶ 27; see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-
21-A, Order of the Appeals Chamber on Hazim Delic‘s Emergency Motion to Reconsider 
Denial of Request for Provisional Release (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 
1, 1999), available at http://icr.icty.org. (listing factors considered in deciding the length of 
the pre-trial detention). 
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v. Limaj,157 the Appeals Chamber stated: ―[t]he ICTY is entrusted with 
bringing justice to the former Yugoslavia.  First and foremost, this means 
justice for the victims, their relatives and other innocent people.  Justice, 
however, also means respect for the alleged perpetrators‘ fundamental 
rights.‖158  It concluded that the ICTY‘s rules on provisional release ―must 
therefore be read in the light of the ICCPR and ECHR and the relevant 
jurisprudence.‖159  In particular, it flagged the ICCPR and ECHR‘s 
mandates that an accused be presumed innocent until proved guilty and that 
―it shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained 
in custody.‖160  It also stated that the international human rights principle of 
proportionality must be considered in interpreting the ICTY‘s rules on 
provisional release.161  The Trial Chamber concluded that ―no distinction 
can be drawn between persons facing criminal procedures in their home 
country or on an international level.‖162 
The ICC appears to agree that it must adhere to international human 
rights norms, even in the context of provisional release.  Unlike the ICTY‘s 
statute, which enumerates the rights of defendants, but does not explicitly 
incorporate international human rights law,163 the Rome Statute creating the 
ICC provides that its law must be interpreted in accordance with 
international human rights law.164  In Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo165 case, 
                                                 
 157. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, & Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Fatmir 
Limaj‘s Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Oct. 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/acdec/en/031031-3.htm. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at ¶ 12. 
 160. Id. at ¶ 9.  Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber denied leave to appeal the Trial 
Chamber decision denying release.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
 161. Id., ¶ 13 (―[W]hen interpreting Rule 65(B) and (D) of the Rules, the general 
principle of proportionality must be taken into account.  A measure in public international 
law is proportional only when it is (1) suitable, (2) necessary and when (3) its degree and 
scope remain in a reasonable relationship to the envisaged target.  Procedural measures 
should never be capricious or excessive.  If it is sufficient to use a more lenient measure 
than mandatory detention, it must be applied.‖); see also Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, 
Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused 
Momir Talic, ¶ 23 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (same); GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER 
KNOOPS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 143 (2005) (noting the ICTY Appeal Chamber‘s observation in Limaj and 
quoting, in part, the same language). 
 162. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, & Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Fatmir 
Limaj‘s Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Oct. 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/acdec/en/031031-3.htm. 
 163. See ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 21 (enumerating the ―Rights of the accused‖). 
 164. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art 21(3). 
 165. Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 12, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ―Decision on the release of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo‖, ¶ 37 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578365.pdf.   
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the Appeals Chamber invoked the ICCPR, the ECHR, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights to support its assertion that ―the Chamber must be vigilant 
that any continued detention would not be for an unreasonably long period 
of time, in breach of internationally recognised human rights.‖166  Of 
course, it did not state that the jurisprudence of courts interpreting those 
conventions in the context of domestic criminal trials would determine the 
length of reasonable detention at the ICC. 
Arguing that international courts should not be bound by precedent 
dealing with the reasonableness of detention in domestic jurisdictions, 
scholars and courts have listed a number of factors that distinguish 
international criminal tribunals from domestic jurisdictions including the 
gravity of the crimes,167 the lack of a police force,168 the security situation 
in the region, the danger in and difficulty of apprehending defendants,169 
                                                 
 166. Id.   
 167. WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 234; see Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-
01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 25 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm (noting that ―the 
Tribunal‘s jurisdiction is limited to serious offences‖); Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana, & 
Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR65, Fofana – Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail, 
¶ 31 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 11, 2005) (stating that ―[i]nternational criminal law 
takes cognisance only of the most heinous crimes known to humankind‖); see also 
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR65, Sesay - Decision on 
Appeal Against Refusal of Bail, ¶¶ 28, 36–37 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Dec. 14, 2004). 
 168. See Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional 
Release, ¶ 24 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm (calling for a more cautious 
approach in assessing the risk that an accused may abscond); Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, 
Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Motion by Momir Talic for Provisional Release, ¶ 18 
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 28, 2001),  
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (explaining that the Tribunal 
depends on local authorities and international bodies to act on its behalf since it has no 
power to execute arrest warrants); Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 
40-PT, Decision on Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 10 
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001) (Robinson, J., dissenting), 
available at http://icr.icty.org (―The Tribunal‘s jurisprudence is that the lack of a police 
force, and its dependence on domestic enforcement mechanisms to enforce its arrest 
warrants, justify a stricter approach to applications for provisional release than is the case 
with applications for bail in domestic jurisdictions.‖); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, 
Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR65, Sesay - Decision on Appeal Against Refusal of Bail, ¶¶ 28, 
36-37 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Dec. 14, 2004) (indicating that meaningful conditions 
and guarantees are important in light of these factors); WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 
236 (expressing the concern that the absence of a police force increases the likelihood that 
―once released an accused could escape the International Tribunal‘s grasp‖).  Wald and 
Martinez also argue that tribunals lack sanctions for violations of release conditions or 
failure to appear.  Id.  However, this argument ignores the power of the court to take into 
account the defendant‘s misconduct at sentencing.  Although this tool requires that the 
defendant be brought again before the court, so too do domestic sanctions for failure to 
appear. 
 169. See WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 235. 
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and the vulnerability of witnesses and evidence due to defendants‘ 
positions of influence along with liberal discovery rules.170 
However, international tribunals are not always as exceptional as 
claimed.  Domestic jurisdictions also try defendants for serious 
international crimes, including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war 
crimes.171  Although in theory the tribunals seek to prosecute the people 
―most responsible‖ and to let domestic jurisdictions handle lower level war 
criminals,172 this is not always the case.173  Moreover, the security situation 
may or may not be appreciably worse than in a domestic jurisdiction.  As 
Safferling notes, in many cases, where the conflict has ended, the risk of 
the defendants engaging in more crimes like those with which they are 
charged is extremely low.174  Finally, although UN peacekeepers and others 
risked their lives to arrest suspects who have absconded, this argument 
does not apply to defendants who have voluntarily surrendered.175  
Furthermore, in domestic jurisdictions, police also often risk their lives to 
arrest suspects. 
All of these arguments seem worthy of concern and support a rigorous 
inquiry into the danger to victims, witnesses and the community, as well as 
the risk of flight.  However, the peculiarities of international tribunals do 
not warrant a blanket denial of release to international criminal defendants 
on trial. Other means of addressing issues like vulnerability of witnesses 
and evidence short of detention, including reforming discovery rules to 
afford victims more protection, should be explored.176 Moreover, the 
special features of international tribunals do not explain why defendants are 
released pre-trial, often for years, and then locked up once the trial begins.  
Still, even if international tribunals are different from domestic 
jurisdictions and are not technically bound by human rights instruments, for 
the reasons described in Section I(A), tribunals should make their 
                                                 
 170. Id. at 237. 
 171. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 655. 
 172. See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (stating that the ICTY 
should ―concentrat[e] on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders suspected of 
being most responsible for crimes within the ICTY‘s jurisdiction and transfer[] cases 
involving those who may not bear this level of responsibility to competent national 
jurisdictions‖); see also S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004) 
(providing that the Security Council ―[c]alls on [the ICTY and ICTR], in reviewing and 
confirming any new indictments, to ensure that any such indictments concentrate on the 
most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the relevant Tribunal as set out in resolution 1503 (2003)‖). 
 173. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 643 (arguing that the pursuit of low-
level cases delays justice). 
 174. See SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 144–45. 
 175. Judge Wald and Professor Jenny Martinez wrote before voluntary surrender of 
defendants became common.   
 176. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 697. 
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provisional release regimes reflect human rights law best practices in order 
to achieve their extremely important function of promoting respect for 
human rights. 
II. PROVISIONAL RELEASE AT THE ICTY  
At the ICTY, largely due to the appearance of governments in the former 
Yugoslavia more willing to work with the tribunal after the European 
Union (EU) made cooperation with the ICTY a condition for admission for 
Croatia and Serbia177 and the rise in voluntary surrenders by defendants,178 
defendants are increasingly being released before trial and even during 
court breaks.179  However, as noted above, all are detained for trial. 
The ICTY is of particular interest in the study of provisional release at 
international tribunals because it has released the greatest number of 
defendants and has the greatest wealth of jurisprudence on release.  Of the 
161 people who have been charged by the ICTY, 35 ICTY defendants have 
been released pre-trial, and 32 have been released for varying periods of 
time after the commencement of trial.180  There are some 598 judicial 
decisions and 522 motions and briefs with the term ―provisional release‖ in 
the title, as well as some 1146 judicial decisions that mention provisional 
release.181 
                                                 
 177. The Croat and Serb governments resisted the Yugoslavia tribunal for years, until the 
European Union made compliance with the tribunal a condition for future EU membership.  
Marcia Luyten, France and the Tutsi have to face justice in Rwanda too, NRC 
HANDELSBLAD, June 23, 2009, 
 http://www.nrc.nl/international/article2280195.ece. 
 178. As of September 7, 2009, of a total 161 indictees, 2 remain at large, 66 were 
arrested, 62 surrendered, 10 died before transfer to the tribunal, 20 had their indictments 
withdrawn, and 1 was transferred from a prison where he was serving an unrelated sentence 
imposed by a local court.  See Email from Stuart Lester, Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Media Office, to author (Sept. 7, 2009, 1:46 PDT) (on file with author). 
 179. For example, the court granted pre-trial release to all six of the accused in Prlic on 
September 8, 2004.  All returned to the UNDU for trial on April 24, 2006.  See Prosecutor v. 
Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74, Case Information Sheet, 
7, 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/cis/en/cis_prlic_al_en.pdf (stating that all six men were 
granted provisional release before trial from September 8, 2004 until April 24, 2006).  
Likewise, in the Stanisic & Simatovic case, on July 28, 2004, the Trial Chamber granted 
provisional release to both accused.  See Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-
03-69, Case Information Sheet, 4, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/cis/en/cis_stanisic_simatovic_en.pdf 
(discussing the procedural history of the case before trial).  On February 6, 2008, the Trial 
Chamber terminated the provisional release of both accused and ordered them to return to 
the UNDU on February 11, 2008 for trial, which was to begin later in the month.  Id. 
 180. See, e.g., supra note 179 (providing two ICTY Case Information Sheets). 
 181. This information is available through the ICTY Court Records search engine, 
http://icr.icty.org. 
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In theory, the law on provisional release at the ICTY comports with 
international human rights, but the reality of excessive discretion, de facto 
detention for trial and the new burden of showing ―sufficiently compelling 
humanitarian circumstances‖ raises human rights concerns. 
A. Provisional Release Procedures at the ICTY 
Generally, upon confirmation of the indictment by a pre-trial chamber of 
the ICTY, the pre-trial chamber issues an arrest warrant, which includes an 
order for prompt transfer of the accused to the ICTY.182  The ICTY has 
determined that ―[t]he arrest warrant provides the legal basis for 
detention.‖183  Once an accused is transferred, he or she is detained by the 
ICTY at the UNDU in The Hague and may not then be released without an 
order of the court.184  It is noteworthy, however, that the rules envision that 
all ICTY defendants arrive pursuant to an arrest warrant.  There is no 
written provision by which they can appear by summons.185 
The ICTY rule on the initial appearance of an accused does not mention 
the issue of detention,186 but a defendant or the court may raise the issue at 
this hearing.187  Thus, it can be said that the defendant is ―entitled to take 
                                                 
 182. Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Order on Miodrag Jokic‘s Motion for 
Provisional Release, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tord/en/20220PR117242.htm; see also Prosecutor v. 
Ademi, Case No. IT-01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 16 (Int‘l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm (noting that the judge 
generally orders prompt transfer of the accused after confirming an indictment). 
 183. Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional 
Release, ¶ 16 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm (outlining the procedural 
considerations for detention and release); see also Gordon, supra note 139, at 690 
(describing the pre-trial detention procedures). 
 184. Pursuant to Rule 64:   
Upon being transferred to the seat of the Tribunal, the accused shall be detained in 
facilities provided by the host country, or by another country.  In exceptional 
circumstances, the accused may be held in facilities outside of the host country.  
The President may, on the application of a party, request modification of the 
conditions of detention of an accused. 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Rule 64, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Rules of 
Procedure], available at  
http://www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/RulesofProcedureandEvidence; see also id. Rule 
65(A) (describing the procedures for release). 
 185. Nevertheless, as noted above, in at least two contempt cases, the court refused to 
issue arrest warrants and instead ordered the defendants to appear by summons.  See supra 
note 5 (providing two examples of cases in which the court ordered an appearance by 
summons in lieu of holding defendants in contempt). 
 186. ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 62 (discussing the right to counsel, 
right to a plea, and right to have material in a language the defendant understands, among 
other rights). 
 187. See Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Order on Miodrag Jokic‘s Motion 
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proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without 
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the 
detention is not lawful‖ such that the requirements of the ICCPR are met.  
However, at the ICTY, ―[t]he fact of detention and the reasons for it are 
rarely, if at all, raised as issues to be discussed at the initial appearance.‖188  
They are handled principally through written submissions.189  The ICTY 
rules do not provide for periodic review of detention decisions.  If a 
defendant wishes to be released, he or she must file a motion. 
At the ICTY, to release a defendant, a Trial Chamber must be satisfied 
that the accused will appear for trial and, if released, pose no risk to any 
victim, witness or other person.190  As noted above, the ECtHR and the 
United States Supreme Court recognize the validity of these grounds for 
detention.191 Although the ICTY has done away with the requirement that a 
defendant also show that ―exceptional circumstances‖ warrant release,192 
                                                 
for Provisional Release, ¶ 16 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tord/en/20220PR117242.htm (explaining that an 
accused may raise the issue of his or her detention proprio motu). 
 188. VLADIMIR TOCHILOVSKY, JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 609 (2008) 
(explaining that the issue of detention generally does not arise until more facts of the case 
have been considered). 
 189. For example, during his initial appearance, ICTY defendant Jadranko Prlic stated 
that he did not believe that he should be detained, but no hearing on provisional release 
occurred at that time.  Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Transcript of Initial 
Appearance, 48:3–4 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 6, 2004), available at 
http://icr.icty.org.  Prlic‘s co-accused, Valentin Coric, also stated ―I am not exactly thrilled 
by the fact that I am being held in detention.‖  Id.  Four months later, there was a provisional 
release hearing for the six defendants in the Prlic case, but the presiding judge instructed the 
parties that it merely wanted to hear if there were any arguments, beyond those made in the 
written submissions, for release.  Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Transcript of 
Motion Hearing, 65:20–25 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 19, 2004), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/trans/en/040719MH.htm.   
Neither party presented any witnesses.  Id. 
 190. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter 
ICTY Rules of Procedure], available at 
 http://www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/RulesofProcedureandEvidence. 
 191. See supra notes 107–08. 
 192. ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 65(B).  Prior to December 1999, an 
accused before the ICTY could be released from detention only if he or she could show that 
―exceptional circumstances‖ warranted release.  Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc. 
IT/32/Rev. 13 (July 10, 1998), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/LegalLibrary/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev13_en.pdf; 
see also DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1430 (proposing language to amend the statute).  Under 
this rule, only four accused were granted provisional release.  DeFrank, supra note 20, at 
1430.  Scholars, defendants and at least one judge criticized the ―exceptional circumstances‖ 
requirement for violating the human rights norm that pretrial detention be the exception 
rather than the rule.  See, e.g., SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 143 (stating that ICTY Rules 
of Procedure 64 and 65 ―foresee detention on remand as the general rule, liberty of the 
suspect as the exception‖ and arguing that this regime violates Article 9(III)2 of the 
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even under the amended rule, the burden of proving that he or she is neither 
a flight risk nor a danger remains on the defendant.193 As noted above, the 
ECtHR has held that the burden of proving the need to detain a criminal 
defendant must be on the prosecution.194 
The ICTY‘s rules also state that the court must give ―the host country 
and the State to which the accused seeks to be released the opportunity to 
be heard.‖195For pre-trial release and release during court breaks, ICTY 
defendants have had few problems getting their home countries to 
guarantee that they will supervise and return the defendant to the ICTY.196  
However, particularly in the early days of the tribunal, judges were 
unwilling to give much weight to these guarantees, since many states in the 
former Yugoslavia were uncooperative with the tribunal and harbored 
fugitives.197  When a defendant is released, he or she falls under the 
jurisdiction of the states to which he or she is released.198 
                                                 
ICCPR); DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1430 (discussing ICTY Judge Robinson‘s view that to 
read Rule 65 in a manner consistent with human rights norms, the burden of proof must be 
on the prosecution).  Various Trial Chambers in early cases stated that the ―exceptional 
circumstances‖ requirement was a reflection of the tribunal‘s incorporation of the notion of 
preventive detention in light of the ―extreme gravity of the crimes for which [the accused] 
are being prosecuted.‖  Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, et al., Case No. IT-95-16-PT, Decision on 
Motion for Provisional Release Filed by Zorna Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic and Dragan Papic (Joined by Marinko Katava and Vladimir Santic), ¶ 10 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 15, 1997), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tdec/en/71215pr2.htm. 
 193. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaz, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on 
Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶ 8 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2007), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/070720.pdf (―It is for the accused to prove 
that the conditions of Rule 65(B) have been met and to satisfy the Trial Chamber that 
release is appropriate in a particular case.‖ (internal citations omitted)); see also DeFrank, 
supra note 20, at 1431 (indicating that the amended rules left the burden of proving release 
factors on the defendant). 
 194. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 195. ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 65(B). 
 196. See Rearick, supra note 4, at 592–93 (noting that, unlike ICTY defendants, ICTR 
defendants have problems in getting released due to the unwillingness of Rwanda or other 
countries to take them). 
 197. Professors Wald and Martinez argued that after an amendment removing the 
―exceptional circumstances‖ requirement, ―the heart of the release proceeding is the 
defendants‘ ability to convince the judges that there are conditions which will guarantee 
their return and the safety of victims and witnesses.‖  WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 
245; see also Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on 
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 18 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org (noting that ―until there 
is evidence of arrests, any guarantee from the government must be treated with caution‖).  
 198. Prosecutor v. Lukic & Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Sredoje Lukic‘s 
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 23 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 13, 
2006), available at http://icr.icty.org (acknowledging that the State and Tribunal must work 
together to satisfy the requirements of Rule 65).   
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The ICTY‘s Statute and Rules provide no basis for compensation for 
unlawful detention.  However, the Appeals Chamber has held that 
compensation would be appropriate for a defendant who is both unlawfully 
detained and acquitted.199  Reversing an earlier decision to release the 
defendant based on several violations of his rights,200 the Appeals Chamber 
in the ICTR case Prosecutor v. Baraygwiza found that the appropriate 
remedy was compensation if the defendant was acquitted or a reduced 
sentence to reflect the violation of his rights if he was convicted.201 
Still, ICTY law makes no provision for compensation of a defendant 
who is acquitted, if the detention was lawful.  ICTY Appeals Judge 
Schomburg has recently explained that: 
It is deplorable that the UN ad hoc International Tribunals are not at least 
in the position to grant financial compensation to accused parties who 
have been acquitted, in particular when the deprivation of liberty over 
years of pre-trial detention and detention pending appeal is in whole or in 
part attributable to the Tribunal.
202
 
Providing compensation to acquitted defendants detained for long 
periods of time would express respect for the human rights compromised 
by lengthy detention. 
B. Judicial Discretion on Provisional Release 
                                                 
 199. E.g., Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision 
(Prosecutor‘s Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 75 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 
Mar. 31, 2000) (deciding that the accused is entitled to compensation if found not guilty); 
Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 
May 31, 2000), 
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CSemanza%5Cdecision
s%5C310500.pdf.  The ICTY and ICTR share an Appeals Chamber, and ICTY Trial 
Chambers must follow the decisions of the Appeals Chamber.  See Carsten Stahn and Göran 
Sluiter, The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, 309 (2009). 
 200. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶¶ 100–101, 104, 113 
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 3, 1999), 
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBarayagwiza%5Cdeci
sions%5Cdcs991103.pdf (finding violations of the defendant‘s rights to be promptly 
charged and to be informed of the charges against him, to a timely initial appearance, to 
challenge the legality of his detention, and to a speedy trial after Baraygwiza‘s three year 
detention on remand, eleven months of which the court declared illegal, and ordering his 
release); see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 256 (noting that in the Appeals Chamber‘s first 
ruling it had dismissed the indictment with prejudice due to the seriousness of the violations 
of the defendants‘ rights). 
 201. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor‘s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 75 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Mar. 31, 2000), 
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBarayagwiza%5Cdeci
sions%5Cdcs20000331.pdf;  
see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 256–57 (discussing the Appeals Chamber‘s decision in 
Barayagwiza).   
 202. See Schomburg, supra note 6, at 77 (conceding that international human rights law 
requires compensation only after a conviction is reversed and not after an acquittal). 
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The broad discretion of ICTY judges to deny release raises international 
human rights problems.  ICTY judges may detain defendants even if they 
pose neither a risk of flight nor a danger.  If ―it is satisfied that the accused 
will appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, 
witness or other person . . . .  Release may be ordered by a Trial 
Chamber.‖203 The rule is a baseline and sets out ―the minimum 
requirements necessary for granting provisional release.‖204  Trial 
Chambers interpreting the rule have clarified that a Trial Chamber may 
exercise its discretion to deny provisional release even where an accused 
meets the requirements of Rule 65(B).205  
ICTY case law provides guidance to judges in deciding risk of flight or 
danger but may do little to cabin the discretion of judges in denying release 
for reasons other than risk of flight or danger. Trial Chambers are to make a 
case-by-case assessment on release based on the concrete situation of the 
accused.206  They must consider not only the circumstances as they are at 
the time of the release decision but also as they are expected to be at the 
time of the accused‘s return to the tribunal if released.207 
Although ―[i]n deciding whether the requirements of Rule 65(B) have 
been met, a Chamber must consider all of those relevant factors that a 
                                                 
 203. ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 65(B) (emphasis added).  In 
addition, ―[t]he Trial Chamber may impose such conditions upon the release of the accused 
as it may determine appropriate, including the execution of a bail bond and the observance 
of such conditions as are necessary to ensure the presence of the accused for trial and the 
protection of others.‖  Id. Rule 65(C) (emphasis added). 
 204. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on 
Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶ 8 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2007), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/070720.pdf. 
 205. Id.  The decision on release is appealable.  See ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra 
note 184Error! Bookmark not defined., Rule 65(D)–(H) (providing rules governing 
appeals). 
 206. Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion for 
Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic, ¶ 21 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm; see also KNOOPS, supra note 
161, at 140 (same). 
 207. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-
AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal From Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise 
en Liberte Provisoire de L’accuse Prlic Dated 7 April 2008‖, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080425.pdf.  The issue has come up in the 
context of political circumstances.  In Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, the Prosecution 
opposed release in part based on an increased risk of flight due to the upcoming elections in 
the Serbian government, which could yield a government hostile to the tribunal.  Prosecutor 
v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 45 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf.  The Trial Chamber 
rejected the argument as too speculative.  Id.  
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reasonable Chamber would have been expected to take into account before 
coming to a decision [and] provide a reasoned opinion indicating its view 
on those relevant factors,‖208 almost all of the factors set out in the case law 
pertain to flight or danger, and judges are not restricted to considering these 
factors.209  According to tribunal jurisprudence, the following factors are 
relevant to the provisional release inquiry:   
(1) Whether the accused is charged with serious criminal offences;  
(2) Whether the accused is likely to face a long prison term, if    
 convicted;  
(3) The circumstances of the accused‘s surrender;210  
(4) The degree of cooperation given by the authorities of the State  
 to which the accused seeks to be released;  
(5) The guarantees offered by those authorities, and any personal  
 guarantees offered by the accused;  
(6) The likelihood that, in case of breach of the conditions of  
 provisional release, the relevant authorities will re-arrest the  
 accused if he declines to surrender;211 and  
(7) The accused‘s degree of cooperation with the Prosecution.212 
                                                 
 208. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, Lukic, Case No. 
IT-05-87-T, Decision on Milutinovic Motion for Temporary Provisional Release, ¶ 12 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 16, 2008),  
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/081216.pdf. 
 209. Id. (―What the relevant factors are, as well as the weight to be accorded to them, 
depends upon the circumstances of each case.‖). 
 210. See Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on 
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 23 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org (quoting the Trial 
Chamber decision stating, ―[i]n the earlier cases in which provisional release was granted, 
the accused in both cases had surrendered voluntarily‖); cf. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case 
No. ICTR-00-55A-R65, Decision on Defence Motion for Reconsideration of Decision 
Denying Provisional Release, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Apr. 3, 2009), 
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CMuvunyi%5Cdecision
s%5C090403.pdf (denying motion to reconsider decision denying provisional release and 
noting that ―the Chamber must take into account the fact that he did not voluntarily 
surrender to the Tribunal, but was apprehended in London‖). 
 211. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision 
on Ramush Haradinaj‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 23, 25 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 6, 2005), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/050606.htm  
(noting that Chambers must take into consideration the position the accused held prior to his 
arrest, since it ―could have an important bearing upon a State‘s willingness and readiness to 
arrest that person if he refuses to surrender himself‖). 
 212. These factors are set forth in a number of ICTY cases.  E.g., Prosecutor v. Stanisic 
and Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶¶ 39–40 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf;  
see also Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaz, & Brahimaj, Decision on Ramush Haradinaj‘s 
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 25 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 6, 
2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/050606.htm (stating that the weight 
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In addition, judges should take into account ―any suggestion that the 
[a]ccused has interfered with the administration of justice since the 
confirmation of the indictment against him;‖213 ―the health condition and 
considerations regarding treatment of ill detainees;‖214 and the complexity 
of the case.215  Of these factors, only the last two are unrelated to risk of 
flight or danger. 
B. The ICTY’s De Facto “Detention for Trial” Regime 
In theory, the standard for release is the same whether or not trial has 
begun.  The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that ―Rule 65(B) applies to 
provisional release issues arising during the trial, just as it applies during 
pre-trial and pre-appeal proceedings.‖216  Nevertheless, early in the 
tribunal‘s existence, an ICTY Trial Chamber stated that ―generally it would 
be inappropriate to grant provisional release during trial because, inter alia, 
release could disrupt the remaining course of the trial.‖217  
In practice, there appears to be a shift in the standard once trial begins.  
Although pre-trial release has become increasingly common, all 
                                                 
given to governmental guarantees is dependent on the circumstances present); Prosecutor v. 
Sainovic & Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR65, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 6 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://icr.icty.org (listing 
the numerous factors considered by the court). 
 213. Stanisic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT at ¶ 39. Prosecutor v. Stanisic and Simatovic, Case 
No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶¶ 39–40 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf 
 214. Id. at ¶¶ 39–40.  
 215. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on 
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 23 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org 
(indicating that if a case is less serious or complex, there is a greater probability that 
provisional release will be granted). 
 216. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, Lukic, Case No. 
IT-05-87-AR65.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of Denial of Provisional Release 
During the Winter Recess, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 2006), 
available at http://icr.icty.org; see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovksi, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, 
Decision Denying a Request for Provisional Release, 3 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 1998), available at http://icr.icty.org (explaining that, because the 
presumption of innocence until a final judgment on the merits and bail decisions implicated 
questions of individual freedom, a defendant could turn to Rule 65(B) to seek release until a 
final decision on the merits). 
 217. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on 
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 10, 14  (Int‘l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org (citing Prosecutor v. 
Kordic & Cerkez, Order on Application by Dario Kordic for Provisional Release Pursuant to 
Rule 65, 4 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 1999)).  According to the 
ICTY Media Office, the Kordic decision is confidential and therefore unavailable to the 
public.  See Email from Joanna Ellis Adwan, Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Media Office, to author (Sept. 16, 2009, 02:35 PDT) (on file with author). 
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defendants, other than a few charged only with contempt,218 remain in 
custody of the UNDU during trial.  Perhaps because all ICTY defendants 
charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes start out 
detained and return to the UNDU for trial is made a condition of their pre-
trial release, defendants do not appear to fight this de facto detention for 
trial regime.  The fight then is merely over whether they are released during 
court breaks219 or due to illness220 or other discrete ―humanitarian 
circumstances.‖ 
ICTY judges seem more comfortable releasing defendants, even for 
short periods, before trial than after trial has begun.  In the case of 
Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic,221 the Trial Chamber characterized the 
case as being in the pre-trial stage before granting release, even though the 
parties had given opening statements and a witness had testified.222  
If a case is near its inception, courts will still grant release by applying 
the ordinary Rule 65(B) risk of flight or danger standard.  For example, 
early in the case of Prosecutor v. Perisic,223 the Trial Chamber granted 
                                                 
 218. See supra note 5 (providing examples of two defendants who were summoned to 
appear in lieu of being held in contempt). 
 219. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, 
Decision on Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶ 24 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/071214.pdf (ordering Haradinaj‘s release to 
Kosovo during the winter court recess after the close of evidence and before judgment); 
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision on Ramush 
Haradinaj‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 51–52 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 6, 2005), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/050606.htm  
(ordering Haradinaj‘s pre-trial release to Kosovo). 
 220. See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion for 
Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic, ¶ 31 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002), 
  http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (ordering that Talic be let out 
of the UNDU due to terminal illness and kept on house arrest in the former Yugoslavia). 
 221. Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶¶ 14, 42, 68 (Int‘l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf. 
 222. Id.  Although the parties had given their opening statements and a witness had been 
called, the Trial Chamber stated that, in its view, ―the case [was then] properly described as 
being in the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.‖  Id. at ¶¶ 6, 42, 63.  The Appeals Chamber 
stated that it was within the Trial Chamber‘s discretion to determine that the case was in the 
pre-trial stage, but found its reasoning inadequate.  The Appeals Chamber nevertheless 
upheld release.  Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-AR65.4, Decision 
on Prosecution Appeal of Decision on Provisional Release and Motions to Present 
Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115, ¶¶ 43, 72–73 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 26, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/acdec/en/080626.pdf.   
 223. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for 
Provisional Release During the Court‘s Winter Recess, ¶ 19 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/081217.pdf. 
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Perisic provisional release for the period of the winter break from 
December 22, 2008 to January 9, 2009 and refused additional security 
measures, such as twenty-four-hour surveillance.224  
As the trial proceeds, courts grow even more reluctant to release 
defendants even for court breaks.  In December 2006, the Appeals 
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Milutinovic225 upheld the Trial Chamber‘s denial 
of provisional release based on the increased risk of flight due to the 
amount of evidence that had come in at trial.226  According to the 
Prosecution, ―since the Defendants had now heard the serious evidence 
against them, they had a higher incentive to abscond, particularly 
considering the potential penalties that might follow a conviction.‖227  
Although the defendants had been released previously and returned for 
trial, the Trial Chamber found that the risk of flight had increased since the 
previous provisional release, because ―17 weeks of trial ha[d] elapsed, and 
85 witnesses ha[d] given evidence relating to multiple alleged crimes 
committed throughout Kosovo for which the Accused are said to be 
responsible.‖228   
The same Trial Chamber refused to consider whether the weight of the 
evidence, including, according to the defendant, the weakening of the 
prosecution‘s case, decreased the risk of flight in the defendant‘s 
subsequent application for provisional release based on compassionate 
grounds.229  In response to the Accused‘s argument that the Prosecution‘s 
case had weakened, the Chamber noted  
For the Chamber to agree with the Accused‘s point about the purported 
weakening of the Prosecution case, it would have to weigh the evidence 
adduced by the Prosecution against that of the Accused, and this is a task 
                                                 
The Perisic trial had started October 2, 2008.  Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, 
Case Information Sheet, 3, 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/cis/en/cis_perisic_en.pdf. 
 224. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for 
Provisional Release During the Court‘s Winter Recess, ¶ 19 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/081217.pdf. 
 225. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, & Lukic, Case 
No. IT-05-87-AR65.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of Denial of Provisional Release 
During the Winter Recess, ¶¶ 14–15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 
2006), available at http://icr.icty.org. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at ¶ 14.   
 228. Id. 
 229. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, & Lukic, Case 
No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Pavkovic Motion for Temporary Provisional Release, ¶ 2 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2007), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/071207c.pdf. 
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reserved for the Chamber‘s final assessment of all the evidence at the 
conclusion of the trial, not at this stage.‖
230
   
Apparently, it is permissible to quantify the prosecution‘s evidence—
number of witnesses, documents, and the like—to assess the likelihood that 
a defendant be inclined to flee, but not to assess the strength or weakness of 
the evidence against the accused for the same purpose.   
The named accused in the case, whom the Trial Chamber refused to 
release based on the amount of the evidence against him, Milutinovic, was 
later acquitted.231  Worse still than the earlier denial of provisional release, 
the Trial Chamber denied release to Milutinovic for the time between the 
end of trial and the delivery of the judgment—a period of six months—
only to finally release him upon the delivery of the judgment.232  
The ICTY, despite recognizing the defendants‘ rights to a speedy trial,233 
has come under fire for delays in completing trials.234 If everyone is 
detained for trial, long trials means long periods of detention. 
Worrying though it may be, lengthy detention before judgment is not, by 
itself, a human rights violation, at least according to the ECtHR.  As ICTY 
judges have noted, the ECtHR has upheld pre-trial detention of several 
years in some circumstances.235  However, the ECtHR has found violations 
of Article 5(3) where the reasons for detention offered by governments 
were insufficient.236  The beginning of trial is, indubitably, insufficient 
ground to justify detention where there is neither risk of flight nor danger. 
                                                 
 230. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 231. Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkociv, Lazarevic, Lukic, & Milutinovic, Case 
Information Sheet, Case No. IT-05-87, 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/cis/en/cis_sainovic_al_en_1.pdf. 
 232. See id. 
 233. ICTY Statute, supra note 59, art. 21(4)(c) (acknowledging that the accused has the 
right ―to be tried without undue delay‖).   
 234. See Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 
79, 82 (2009) (criticizing the slow pace of international criminal justice and surveying the 
literature discussing the length of international criminal proceedings).  
 235. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on 
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org; W. v. Switzerland, 254 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1993) (four years pre-trial detention); Ferrari-Braro v. Italy, App. 
9627/81, 37 Eur. Comm‘n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 15 (1984) (Eleven months pre-trial detention). 
 236. See, e.g., Letellier v. France, 207 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 9, ¶¶ 13, 33 (1991) 
(finding that, despite the gravity of the alleged crime, murder for hire, and the potentially 
lengthy sentence the defendant faced, there was insufficient evidence of risk of flight or 
obstruction or danger to the public order to justify her continued detention); Neumeister v. 
Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 39, ¶ 10 (1968) (finding insufficient evidence of risk of 
flight to justify seven years of detention during the investigation and trial).   
CAROLINE DAVIDSON.OFFTOPRINTER 60.1 
2010] NO SHORTCUTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 45 
 
C. Release, a Moving Target: The “Sufficiently Compelling 
Humanitarian Circumstances” Requirement after the Close of the 
Prosecution’s Case 
After the close of the prosecution‘s case, if a Trial Chamber declines to 
issue a judgment of acquittal on all counts, release even on court breaks 
becomes more difficult.237  In March 2008, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
added a new requirement for provisional release, not stated in Rule 65, for 
cases in which Trial Chambers have declined to enter a judgment of 
acquittal at the end of the prosecution‘s case.238  At this stage, for an 
accused to be released, not only must a trial chamber conduct a new 
assessment of the risk of flight in light of the 98 bis decision,239 but also it 
must find that there exist ―serious and sufficiently compelling humanitarian 
reasons‖ for the release.240   
With one exception,241 subsequent Appeals Chamber decisions 
confirmed that ―serious and compelling humanitarian circumstances‖ 
                                                 
 237. As at all of the international tribunals, ICTY defendants have an opportunity to seek 
a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution case.  See SCHABAS, supra note 62, at 
516 (linking this opportunity to the presumption of innocence and the prosecutor‘s burden 
of proof).  Rule 98 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY provides:  ―At 
the close of the Prosecutor‘s case, the Trial Chamber shall, by oral decision and after 
hearing the oral submissions of the parties, enter a judgement of acquittal on any count if 
there is no evidence capable of supporting a conviction.‖  Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 98 bis, U.N. Doc. 
IT/32/Rev. 43 (July 24, 2009), available at 
 http://www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/RulesofProcedureandEvidence.  
 238. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-
AR65.5, Decision on Prosecution‘s Consolidated Appeal Against Decisions to Provisionally 
Release The Accused Prlic, Stojic, Petkovic and Coric, ¶ 20 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080311.pdf. 
 239. Id. at ¶ 20 (―The Appeals Chamber considers that the 98 bis Ruling in this case 
constitutes a significant enough change in circumstance to warrant the renewed and explicit 
consideration by the Trial Chamber of the risk of flight posed by the accused pursuant to 
Rule 65(B) of the Rules.‖).   
 240. Id. at ¶ 21 (holding that the accused did not set forth ―sufficiently compelling‖ 
humanitarian justifications for release). 
 241. In the Pusic Appeals Chamber decision, reached by a different panel of judges, the 
majority stated:   
Because Rule 65(B) of the Rules does not require ‗sufficiently compelling‘ 
humanitarian reasons for provisional release, this Bench understands the Prlic 
Decision of 11 March 2008 to have ruled that it is only when a Trial Chamber, 
having considered all the circumstances of the case and the impact of the 
significant change of circumstances constituted by the 98 bis decision, cannot 
exclude the existence of flight risk or danger, that ―sufficiently compelling‖ 
humanitarian reasons, coupled with necessary and sufficient measures to alleviate 
any flight risk or danger, can constitute a basis for resolving uncertainty and doubt 
in favour of provisional release. 
Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, 
Reasons for Decision on Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision Relative a la 
Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L‘accuse Pusic‖, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
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indeed amounted to an additional requirement to the other Rule 65(B) 
requirements (the absence of flight or danger) after the 98 bis stage.242  The 
Appeals Chamber also added a requirement that the duration of the release 
be proportional to the circumstance warranting the release—‖for example, 
the need to visit a seriously ill family member in the hospital would justify 
provisional release of a sufficient time to visit the family member‖ and no 
longer.243  This requirement flips the international human rights notion of 
proportionality—that the measure should be no more restrictive than 
necessary to assure that a defendant appear for trial and pose no danger—
on its head.244 
Various judges objected to the new ―sufficiently compelling 
humanitarian circumstances‖ requirement in dissents on the basis that it is 
absent from the rule; it elides the distinction between the standard for those 
already convicted and those who merely stand accused and thereby 
contravenes the presumption of innocence; and essentially adds back into 
the rule the old ―exceptional circumstances‖ requirement.245  Judge 
                                                 
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 23, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf (emphasis added).   
 242. See Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-
74-AR65.7, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal from Decision Relative a la Demande de 
Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L’accuse Petkovic Dated 31 March 2008‖, ¶ 2 (Int‘l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 21, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tdec/en/080421.pdf; see also Prosecutor v. Popovic, 
Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic, Case Nos. IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 
65.6, Decision on Consolidated Appeal Against Decision on Borovcanin‘s Motion for a 
Custodial Visit and Decisions on Gvero‘s and Miletic‘s Motions for Provisional Release 
During the Break in the Proceedings, ¶ 24 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 
15, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/acdec/en/080515.pdf; Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, 
Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s 
Appeal from Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L’Accuse 
Prlic dated 7 April 2008‖, ¶ 16 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080425.pdf  
 243. Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.7, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s 
Appeal from Decision relative a la demande de mise en liberte provisoire de l‘accuse 
Petkovic dated 31 March 2008,‖ ¶ 17 (Apr. 21, 2008); Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. 
IT-04-74-AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal From Decision relative a la demande 
de mise en liberte provisoire de l‘accuse Prlic Dated 7 April 2008,‖ ¶ 16 (Apr. 25, 2008). 
 244. See supra note 161 (describing the three-factor test for whether an international law 
is proportionate: suitability, necessity, and reasonableness). 
 245. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.7, Decision on 
―Prosecution‘s Appeal from Decision relative a la demade de mise en liberte provisoire de 
l‘accuse Petkovic Dated 31 March 2008,‖ ¶ 4 (Apr. 21, 2008) (Guney, J., dissenting in part); 
see also Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., Case Nos. IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, Decision on 
Consolidated Appeal Against Decision on Borovcanin‘s Motion for a Custodial Visit and 
Decisions on Gvero and Miletic‘s Motions for Provisional Release During the Break in the 
Proceedings, ¶ 3 (May 15, 2008) (Liu, J., dissenting in part) (―As for what exactly 
‗compelling humanitarian reasons‘ are, although they have not been defined by the 
Majority, they seem to amount to the same as the previous ‗exceptional circumstances‘ in 
practice.‖). 
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Schomburg noted that it also would make little sense to defendants and 
their families to, on the one hand, be told that a Trial Chamber ―excludes 
the risk of flight and the risk of suppression of evidence and nevertheless in 
the same decision exercises its discretion by ordering the ongoing 
deprivation of liberty in the UNDU after the expiration of release for a 
‗fixed period.‘‖246  Finally, Judge Schomburg objected to the new rule 
insofar as it appeared to be creating a new type of ―temporary release‖ 
before a judgment of guilt or innocence neither provided for in the rule, nor 
seen in domestic jurisdictions.247 
These new judicially-created rules resulted in a spate of filings centering 
on the highly factual inquiry into circumstances warranting release.  
Ultimately, the filings turned into a fight over the sickness and propinquity 
of relatives.248  After failing before, defendants beefed up their cases for 
humanitarian circumstances.  When the Appeals Chamber overturned an 
                                                 
 246. Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on 
Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision de l‘accuse Pusic‖ Issued on 14 April 2008, 
¶ 10 (Apr. 23, 2008) (Schomburg, J., dissenting).  In his dissent, Judge Schomburg noted 
that he had answered this dilemma in a previous dissenting opinion in the Prlic case.  Id. 
¶ 10 n.12.  Unfortunately, as the dissent is confidential, his solution will remain a mystery to 
the public.  See Email from Stuart Lester, Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Media 
Office, to author (Sept. 10, 2009, 01:06 PDT) (on file with author).  
 247. Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on 
Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision de l‘accuse Pusic‖ Issued on 14 April 2008, 
¶ 1 (Apr. 23, 2008) (Schomburg, J., dissenting).  In his dissent from the Pusic Appeals 
Judgment, Judge Schomburg contended that these humanitarian releases, which he dubbed 
―temporary release,‖ are ―an artefact [sic] in principle not foreseen in criminal proceedings‖ 
in either the law of the ICTY or in domestic jurisdictions other than for convicted persons.  
Id. at ¶ 1.  Citing time constraints in issuing the decision, Schomburg gave only one German 
source for the proposition that ―temporary release‖ did not exist in domestic jurisdictions. 
Id. at ¶ 1 n.1.  In fact, the U.S. federal system provides at least one example of a jurisdiction 
that allows for temporary release.  The U.S. Bail Reform Act allows for ―temporary release 
of the person, in the custody of a United States marshal or another appropriate person, to the 
extent that the judicial officer determines such release to be necessary for preparation of the 
person‘s defense or for another compelling reason.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (2006). 
 248. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & 
Pandurevic, Case Nos. IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, Decision on Consolidated Appeal Against 
Decision on Borovcanin‘s Motion for a Custodial Visit and Decisions on Gvero‘s and 
Miletic‘s Motions for Provisional Release During the Break in the Proceedings, ¶¶ 9, 26, 28  
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 15, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/acdec/en/080515.pdf (deciding that a father‘s illness or 
death does not justify provisional release); Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, 
Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal From 
Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L’Accuse Prlic Dated 7 
April 2008‖, ¶¶ 4–5 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080425.pdf (listing, specifically, the defendant‘s 
father‘s gradual blindness, his father‘s surgery for cancer, his mother‘s health condition, and 
his brother‘s liver transplant as humanitarian reasons supporting temporary release); 
Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution‘s 
Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision de l‘accuse Pusic‖ Issued on 14 April 2008, ¶ 11 (Apr. 
23, 2008) (describing the ―ill-health of [] family members‖ as the second basis for the 
accused‘s release). 
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order releasing an accused because he had offered no humanitarian 
circumstances justifying his release,249 not surprisingly, by the next court 
break, he had found some humanitarian reasons to support his release.250 
This back and forth on whether or not the humanitarian circumstances 
were sufficiently compelling reflects the notion that ―motions for 
provisional release are fact intensive and cases are considered on an 
individual basis in light of the particular circumstances of the individual 
accused.‖251  Case-specific factual inquiries on release are indeed 
appropriate and consistent with human rights norms,252 but the ICTY‘s 
focus on humanitarian circumstances has detracted from the bigger issue—
the defendant‘s right to liberty itself—which should mean release absent a 
significant public interest in detaining him or her. 
The focus on ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian circumstances‖ has 
also engendered some rather bold defense motions.  Deeming irrelevant the 
fact that he had been on the lam for years, Vujadin Popovic sought release 
on the basis of ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian circumstances.‖253   
                                                 
 249. Gvero had argued that he should be released simply because he was neither a risk of 
flight nor a danger.  Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for 
Decision on Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision de l‘accuse Pusic‖ Issued on 
14 April 2008, ¶¶ 23–24 (Apr. 23, 2008). 
 250. Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic, 
Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Gvero‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 21 (Int‘l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tdec/en/080721b.pdf (granting release based on 
Gvero‘s poor health and that of his sister); see also Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, 
Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Gvero‘s 
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 6–8 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 
10, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tdec/en/081210a.pdf (noting that Gvero submitted that 
―his well-being has deteriorated during the course of proceedings‖ and that Gvero 
―highlight[e]d that the Trial Chamber [wa]s approaching one of the most critical points in 
the trial for Gvero, namely the presentation of his own case, and stresses the importance for 
him to be able to participate in his own defense and more particularly, his ability to be in top 
psychological condition during the course of his own case.‖) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 251. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-
AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal From Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise 
en Liberte Provisoire de L’Accuse Prlic Dated 7 April 2008‖, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080425.pdf (explaining the factors that must be 
considered in deciding whether the Rule 65(B) requirements have been met). 
 252. See W. v. Switzerland, 254 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 15 (1993) (stating that ―the 
reasonable time cannot be assessed in abstracto,‖ but rather that ―the reasonableness of an 
accused person‘s continued detention must be assessed in each case according to its special 
features‖). 
 253. Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic, 
Case No. IT-05-88-AR65.7, Decision on Vujadin Popovic‘s Interlocutory Appeal Against 
the Decision on Popovic‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 3, 12 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 1, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/acdec/en/080701.pdf (appealing the Trial Chamber‘s 
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Perhaps the most audacious motion was that of Milan Lukic.  One month 
after being convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes for 
burning alive approximately 120 women, children, and elderly people; 
killing several Bosnian-Muslim men; beating Bosnian-Muslim men in 
detention; and killing a Bosnian-Muslim woman at point blank range,254 
Lukic filed for release on compassionate grounds to allow him to visit his 
―ailing and elderly parents‖ whom he had not seen since 1998.255  The 
reason he had not seen his parents for seven years was that he was actively 
evading arrest by the Tribunal before his arrest in Argentina in 2005.256  As 
one member of the Office of the Prosecutor facetiously stated off the 
record, ―[p]erhaps one could argue that conviction for crimes against 
humanity is traumatic enough to be considered a factor supporting release 
on humanitarian grounds?‖257 
The ICTY‘s explanation for the heightened release standard post-98 bis 
is also troubling in light of the presumption of innocence.  The courts have 
justified it based on the increased risk of flight, but one wonders whether 
flight is really the issue.  Indeed, four of the defendants in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Prlic258 argued that it was hard to see how the Trial Chamber 
98 bis finding against them could have affected their perceptions of the risk 
of conviction since they had not made any Rule 98 bis submissions, which 
indicated that they already believed they would not win on a motion for 
judgment of acquittal after the prosecution rested.259  The language of the 
                                                 
decision denying him release to visit his ailing mother and arguing that ―his whereabouts 
before his surrender to the Tribunal have no bearing on whether he currently poses a flight 
risk‖). 
 254. See Prosecutor v. Lukic & Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement Summary For 
Milan Lukic and Sredoje Lukic (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_Lukic_sredoje_Lukic/tjug/en/090720_judg_summary_en
.pdf (describing the court‘s findings on the defendant‘s involvement in crimes). 
 255. See Prosecutor v. Lukic and Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Decision on Milan 
Lukic‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 2, 4 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Aug. 28, 2009), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_lukic_sredoje_lukic/acdec/en/090828.pdf (arguing that 
because his parents were ill, he ―‗should be entitled, at a minimum, to the same compassion‘ 
as that granted to other accused‖). 
 256. See id. at ¶ 6 (providing the Prosecution‘s reasons for opposing the defendant‘s 
motion for provisional release). 
 257. Email from OTP lawyer, to author (July 30, 2009) (on file with author). 
 258. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-
AR65.5, Decision on Prosecution‘s Consolidated Appeal Against Decisions to Provisionally 
Release the Accused Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic and Coric, ¶¶ 14, 18 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080311.pdf.  
 259. Id. (mentioning that of the six defendants, Pusic and Coric were the only ones who 
had moved for a judgment of acquittal).  Likewise, in the Perisic case, the defense argued 
that the ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian grounds‖ did not apply since ―there [had 
been] no Rule 98 bis submissions and consequently no pronouncements by the Trial 
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Perisic Trial Chamber in rejecting the defense argument that the absence of 
a 98 bis ruling made the ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian 
circumstances‖ standard inapplicable supports this argument.  It stated:  
Rule 98bis is used when the Defence is of the view that there is no 
evidence capable of supporting a conviction.  The corollary is that when 
the Defence does not use this provision, it is of the view that it does have 
a case to answer.
260
 
This language lends support to the notion that a defendant who presents 
not Rule 98 bis submissions already believes that he or she has a case to 
answer and would not be surprised by a judicial decision saying so. 
Although the judges claimed otherwise, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the heightened standard reflects a sentiment about the 
increased likelihood of conviction.  In one dissent, Judge Schomburg stated 
that the relevant inquiry was whether ―this specific 98 bis Ruling, which 
dismissed [the defendant]‘s motion to enter a judgment for acquittal had an 
effect on [the defendant]‘s readiness and willingness to appear again for 
trial.‖261  However, in another, Judge Liu noted that the probability of 
conviction plays a role in the provisional release decision.262  
The great disparities in the strictness of the ―sufficiently compelling 
humanitarian circumstances‖ requirement from trial chamber to trial 
chamber appears to reflect the judges‘ profound ambivalence or perhaps 
                                                 
Chamber as to the potential guilt or innocence of the Accused.‖  Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case 
No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 2 (Int‘l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/100331.pdf. 
 260. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for 
Provisional Release, ¶ 20 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/100331.pdf. 
 261. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-
AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision Relative 
a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L‘Accuse Pusic‖, ¶ 5 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 23, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf  
(Schomburg, J., dissenting) (finding that the Trial Chamber had failed to assess sufficiently 
the potential change in Mr. Pusic‘s incentives to flee). 
 262. Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic, 
Case Nos. IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, Decision on Consolidated Appeal Against Decision on 
Borovcanin‘s Motion for a Custodial Visit and Decisions on Gvero‘s and Miletic‘s Motions 
for Provisional Release During the Break in the Proceedings, ¶ 2 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 15, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/acdec/en/080515.pdf (Liu, J., dissenting in part) 
(stating ―like the Majority‘s new ‗compelling humanitarian reasons‘, the Trial Chambers in 
determining the existence of ‗exceptional circumstances‘ considered the probability of a 
conviction when they considered ‗whether there is reasonable suspicion that [an accused] 
committed the crime or crimes charged‘‖ (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, & 
Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release Filed by the 
Accused Zejnil Delalic, ¶ 21 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 25, 1996), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/60925PR2.htm)). 
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disagreement about the propriety of letting defendants on trial for war 
crimes out at all.  In most instances, judges demand that defendants offer 
humanitarian circumstances beyond the length of the trial and their 
detention alone.  However, the release of one accused, well after the 98 bis 
decision, suggests that some judges are more disturbed by the lengthy 
detention of accused during trial and are seeking to address the problem in 
the only manner allowed by tribunal jurisprudence.  Citing the Registrar‘s 
Report on the problems associated with lengthy detention, the Prlic Trial 
Chamber found that ―the long time spent in provisional detention and the 
foreseeable length of the trial . . .  constitute[d] a sufficiently compelling 
humanitarian reason for granting [the defendant] provisional release.‖263  
The Trial Chamber ordered the defendant‘s release over the month-long 
summer court recess.264 
D. Victims’ Rights and Provisional Release at the ICTY 
The ICTY does not allow victims any participation rights.265  However, 
the provisional release decisions reflect a concern over victims‘ rights to 
protection and their interests generally.  The decision to require 
―sufficiently compelling humanitarian circumstances‖ seems in no small 
part motivated by concern for victims.  Even though the rules of the ICTY 
do not require judges to consider the interests of victims, the Appeals 
Chamber has counseled judges to consider the prejudicial effects on 
victims and witnesses living in the region to which the accused will be 
released before granting release.  The Appeals Chamber also has defined 
broadly the interests of victims it seeks to protect: 
                                                 
 263. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-T, 
Redacted Version of ―Decision on Slobodan Praljak‘s Motion for Provisional Release (2009 
Summer Judicial Recess)‖, ¶¶ 32–34 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 25, 
2009), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tdec/en/090525.pdf (citing the Registrar‘s Report 
on Detention and noting that Praljak had been detained since the beginning of the 
proceedings, which amounted to over three years, and that he had not been released for the 
past year and a half, and concluding that, since ―in such a lengthy trial, the good physical 
and mental health of the Accused is particularly important in ensuring that the proceedings 
go forward smoothly and efficiently. . . . [A] short period spent with his relatives would help 
ease the negative effects of lengthy detention on the Accused Praljak‖). 
 264. Id. at ¶ 34.  The Trial Chamber noted that Praljak had been held in the UNDU since 
the beginning of the proceedings and had not been provisionally released in a year and a 
half.  Id. at ¶ 31. 
 265. See DOAK, supra note 121, at 136 (―It has been suggested that the minimalist nature 
of participatory rights granted to victims in the ad hoc tribunals is attributable to fears that 
the presence of victims could cause undue delay in the trial process, thereby jeopardizing 
the rights of the accused to be tried expeditiously.‖); see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 220 
(citing ICTY and ICTR Rules Of Procedure 2 and noting that, unlike the ICC, the ad hoc 
tribunals defined ―victims‖ very narrowly as persons ―against whom a crime over which the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction has allegedly been committed‖).   
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The perception that persons accused of international crimes are released, 
for a prolonged period of time, after a decision that a reasonable trier of 
fact could make a finding beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused 
is guilty (this being the meaning of a decision dismissing a Rule 98bis 
motion), could have a prejudicial effect of victims and witnesses.
266
 
In his dissent from the Pusic Appeals Decision, Judge Schomburg noted 
that it is ―difficult for alleged victims and their relatives to comprehend that 
alleged war criminals [are] permitted to be in the region whilst they would 
expect him to answer his case before the International Tribunal.‖267   
Judge Schomburg has articulated what seems to be a concern about the 
effect of provisional release on the ―expressive‖ function of international 
tribunals to condemn war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
by releasing defendants who are on trial for such crimes.  Arguing against 
releasing defendants for court breaks, Judge Schomburg argued that such a 
regime ―would in practical terms convey the impression, particularly to the 
people in the States on the territory of the former Yugoslavia that accused 
before the International Tribunal are let out on holidays.‖268  The worry is, 
presumably, not only over victim dissatisfaction with the tribunal, but also 
that this ―impression‖ risks sending the message of the insignificance of the 
crimes and thus undermining the expressive function and the potential 
transitional justice benefits of the trials.  At the ICC, victims have voiced 
the same concern.269  However, as discussed below in Part IV.5, the place 
for sending the message on the gravity of the crimes is sentencing, not 
release, where defendants are presumed innocent. 
                                                 
 266. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-
AR65.7, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal from Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise 
en Liberte Provisoire de L‘Accuse Petkovic‖, ¶ 17 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Apr. 21, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tdec/en/080421.pdf (offering this explanation for the 
―sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons‖ rule). 
 267. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-
AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision Relative 
a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L‘Accuse Pusic‖, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 23, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf (Schomburg, J., dissenting) 
(juxtaposing the interests and concerns of victims and their families with those of the 
Accused and their families). 
 268. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 269. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 12, Judgment on the 
appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ―Decision on the 
release of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo‖, ¶ 28 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Oct. 21, 2008), 
http://www.iclklamberg.com/Caselaw/DRC/Dyilo/Appeals/1487.pdf (noting victims‘ 
argument that the release of the defendant could ―create the impression that the conscription, 
enlistment or use of child soldiers is not a serious offence‖); see also id. at ¶ 9 (Pikis, J., 
dissenting) (noting the victims‘ arguments against Lubanga‘s release including that it would 
―cultivate a sense of impunity on the part of perpetrators of grave crimes‖). 
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III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF PROVISIONAL RELEASE AT 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
A number of reforms could help international tribunals better serve as a 
model of respect for human rights.  Below, I evaluate a series of measures 
in light of the human rights issues identified above, including the rights to 
be presumed innocent, to bail (or at least a bail hearing), to liberty and 
security of the person, and to a speedy and fair trial, as well as victims‘ 
rights.  I also assess the measures against the balance struck on these rights 
by the ECtHR and national courts.  No one measure does away with the 
human rights problems associated with decisions on provisional release, 
but each represents a step in the right direction.  
A. Streamlined and Possibly Sequential Trials 
1. Streamlined trials 
As many have recognized, whether any other reforms of provisional 
release occur, ―speedier and shorter trials‖ would help address the human 
rights concerns associated with the lengthy detention before conviction of 
international defendants.270  The ICTY has already implemented a number 
of procedural changes in an attempt to reduce the length of trials. It has 
hired ad hoc judges and given judges more flexible assignments.271  
Controversially, it has changed its rules to allow documentary evidence and 
out-of-court statements in lieu of in-court testimony.
272
  Judges are 
increasingly limiting the number of witnesses and length of testimony 
allowed.273 
                                                 
 270. E.g., Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on 
Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise en Liberte 
Provisoire de l‘accuse Pusic‖, ¶¶ 10–11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 
23, 2008) (Schomburg, J., dissenting) 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf (suggesting that the answer to the 
dilemma of detention during long trials lays in having expeditious trials, not in releasing 
defendants); see also WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 245 (advocating shorter trials); 
Iain Bonomy, The Reality of Conducting a War Crimes Trial, 5 J. INT‘L. CRIM. JUST. 348–51 
(2007) (discussing the need for strict trial management by judges and a lesser reliance on the 
adversarial system to make international trials more efficient). 
 271. WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 245. 
 272. See ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 253–54 (noting that the flexibility should help 
address the problem of lengthy trials). 
 273. Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 699; see also Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case 
No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on the Application of Rule 73 bis, ¶ 2 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2009), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tdec/en/091008.pdf  
(noting that the Chamber had ordered the Prosecution to make written submissions on 
reducing the size of the trial and that the Prosecution had reduced the number of witnesses, 
locations, and the estimated time needed for its examination-in-chief). 
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There is also an increasing recognition that the mega-trials, in which 
many defendants and/or charges are joined together, may make speedy 
trials extremely difficult to deliver.  Mega-trials make it hard to get cases 
ready for trial and, ultimately, to complete the trial quickly.274 
Even if mega-trials increase efficiency for a tribunal as a whole and 
better judicial control can make them shorter, for any given accused, being 
a part of a multi-defendant mega-trial inevitably leads to a longer trial than 
he or she otherwise would have had.  Not all prosecution evidence will 
relate to all accused.  Moreover, each defendant may wish to cross-examine 
separately prosecution witnesses and call witnesses in his or her defense.275  
If all defendants are detained during trial, this effect necessarily makes for 
longer detention.  Thus, unless release during trial becomes a more realistic 
option, the mega-trial seems to pose a grave challenge to the human rights 
of defendants.   
Backing the tribunal‘s guarantee of speedy rights with rules with teeth 
also would help to push prosecutors to engage in the necessary 
streamlining.  Tribunals should consider instituting a speedy trial clock 
whereby cases must be completed within a certain period of time, which 
would reduce the length of detention for those detained for trial.276  
Overall, streamlining trials scores well in a human rights evaluation.  
Smaller cases help to ensure that the defendant receives a speedy trial.277  
                                                 
 274. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 699 (noting that even though the court 
statutes provide a right to a speedy trial, international defendants can have waits of several 
years before their trials are concluded). It bears noting though that some multi-defendant 
mega-trials have been completed reasonably quickly and the experience and style of the 
judges may be a more critical factor than the number of defendants or charges. See PATRICIA 
M. WALD, TYRANTS ON TRIAL:  KEEPING ORDER IN THE COURTROOM 20 (2009), 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publ
ications/tyrants_20090911/tyrants_20090911.pdf (noting that the Omarska trial with five 
defendants lasted only 113 trial days); Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pevkovic, Lazarevic, 
Lukic, & Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87, Case Information Sheet, 5, 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/cis/en/cis_sainovic_al_en.pdf  
(showing that the Milutinovic case, now known as the Sainovic case since Milutinovic‘s 
acquittal, with six defendants, lasted less than two years). 
 275. The ICTY mega-trials bear out this possibility. 
 276. In the United States federal system, for example, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 
requires that trial begin ―within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the 
information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial 
officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.‖  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(c)(1) (2006). 
 277. See Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-
74-AR65.6, ―Decision de L‘accuse a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L‘accuse 
Pusic‖, ¶ 11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 23, 2008) (Schomburg, J., 
dissenting),  
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf (noting that an accused has the right 
to a speedy trial).  Judge Schomburg argued that, therefore, ―periods where a Trial Chamber 
does not conduct hearings must be as short as possible, taking into account only the parties‘ 
needs for preparing their cases but not the wish of the accused for ―temporary release.‖  Id.  
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The prosecution and defense will need less time to get ready for trial, and 
the trial should take less time.  The streamlined trial does not do away with 
fair trial concerns about a defendant‘s ability to prepare a defense while 
incarcerated, but it addresses the problems associated with lengthy 
detention discussed above.   
Bringing fewer charges and trying fewer defendants at once will improve 
compliance with other core defendants‘ rights.  Since the presumption of 
innocence and the right to liberty go away if a defendant is convicted in a 
final judgment on the merits and given prison time, the shorter the trial 
before a conviction, the less time a defendant is detained (even if all 
defendants are detained for trial) while he or she is presumed innocent.   
Despite the defendants‘ rights benefits of shorter trials, the ECtHR has 
been very deferential to national courts in their decisions joining 
defendants and charges.278  In Neumeister v. Austria,279 for example, the 
ECtHR seemed reluctant to impeach Austria‘s decision to join the 
defendant‘s case with those of several others even though ―[t]he course of 
the investigation would probably have been accelerated had the Applicant‘s 
case been severed from those of his co-accused.‖280  The court reasoned 
that ―nothing suggests that such a severance would here have been 
compatible with the good administration of justice.‖281  The court may have 
shown less deference had the defendant still been detained.282 
Nevertheless, streamlining cases has its drawbacks.  Severing the trials 
of accused whose conduct is related and reducing the number of counts and 
incidents charged against each individual accused means that trials are 
unlikely to create a full historical record of events.283  As part of 
                                                 
 278. E.g., Neumeister v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42 (1968). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See STEYTLER, supra note 61, at 146 (citing Stogemuller v. Austria, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) at 40, (1969)) (arguing that where an accused is detained pending trial, the court and 
the prosecution should employ special diligence to ensure the expeditious completion of the 
case).  But see Ferrari-Bravo v. Italy, App. No. 9627/81, Eur. Comm‘n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
15, 39–40 (1984) (finding no violation of Article 5(3) for detention on remand of 4 years 
and 11 months and that the considerable period of detention on remand involved in that case 
was ―inextricably bound up with the duration of the criminal proceedings themselves,‖ 
which was enlarged ―due to the fact that the judicial authorities decided to combine the 
various proceedings in a single trial, which assumed substantial proportions in 
consequence‖). 
 283. See Michael P. Scharf & Ahran Kang, Errors and Missteps:  Key Lessons the Iraqi 
Special Tribunal Can Learn from the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, 38 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 911, 
919–20 (2005) (arguing that the Iraqi Tribunal should avoid ―mega trials‖ dealing with 
events ―occurring in many places and spanning over long periods of time‖ and conceding 
that doing so ―will not help to establish a comprehensive historic record of the atrocities 
committed under the regime of Hussein,‖ but maintaining that other institutions like truth 
commissions would be better suited to doing so). 
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prioritizing the aim of promoting respect for human rights and the rule of 
law through international criminal justice, this cost is one that tribunals 
may have to accept.  Other mechanisms, such as truth commissions, which 
are typically considered better means of creating a historical record, should 
be used to complement international criminal trials as a means of creating a 
historical record.284   
Further, streamlining cases by dropping charges or factual allegations 
against defendants may distort sentencing.  Although one might think that 
the penalty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide would 
always be life imprisonment, often defendants receive significantly shorter 
sentences than they would likely receive for murder in many domestic 
jurisdictions.285  Since conviction of an international crime usually does not 
mean a life sentence, the fewer crimes charged, arguably, the lower the 
sentence a defendant may face.  For example, the Appeals Chamber in 
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic286 found that its reversal of his 
convictions for a few shelling incidents reduced ―Milosevic‘s overall 
culpability‖ because fewer victims could be imputed to him even though 
the findings behind the reversal ―d[id] not change the fact that the entire 
population of Sarajevo was the victim of the crime of terror committed 
under Milosevic‘s command.‖287  A defendant‘s sentence may only reflect 
the gravity of his or her actions if the full scope of his or her activities is 
presented to the court. 
Finally, streamlining cases may produce other human rights costs by 
reducing opportunities for victims to participate in trials.288  The vocal 
opposition of victims‘ groups to the streamlining of the case against 
Radovan Karadzic demonstrates that victims may not be pleased with this 
                                                 
 284. See supra note 37 (noting scholars‘ arguments that truth commissions are a better 
means of creating a historical record). 
 285. See Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 56, at 688–89 (stating that ―[i]t appears that 
some ICTY sentencing Chambers apply either a remarkably low formula to calculate the 
length of time to be spent in prison in relation to the total quantum of human suffering 
caused, or afford quite extraordinary weight to mitigating factors‖); see also DRUMBL, supra 
note 28, at 154–55 (explaining that ―at both the national and international levels, sentences 
for multiple international crimes are generally not lengthier than what national jurisdictions 
award for a single serious ordinary crime‖). 
 286. Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgement (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 12, 2009), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/acjug/en/091112.pdf. 
 287. Id. at ¶ 335.   
 288. See ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 221 (noting that ―one of the central traits of a system 
that does not allow for direct participation of victims in the process is that the Prosecutor 
may, albeit involuntarily, instrumentalize victims.  In other words, there is the risk that 
victims will be allowed to participate only in so far as their claims are useful to the overall 
strategy of Prosecution‖). 
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reform.289  A member of the group ―Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa 
Enclaves‖ told reporters that ―victims will no longer appear as witnesses at 
trials.  We will ignore them.  We will not take part in the work of the 
Tribunal.  They know they cannot go on without our help.  So, they should 
then release Karadzic.‖290  Then again, long trials may not serve victims‘ 
interests in justice since the longer the trials, the fewer defendants can be 
tried and, at least in some cases, defendants may die before judgment.  
Moreover, mechanisms other than long trials, such as explicit participation 
rights, are a more targeted and effective means of addressing victim 
participation. 
2. Sequential trials 
Even though the Saddam Hussein trial is considered ―one of the messier 
trials in legal history,‖291 its approach of tackling incidents one by one is 
worth considering.  The issue of bail and its attendant human rights 
implications, including the presumption of innocence, disappear once a 
person is convicted of a crime, assuming that his or her sentence is 
sufficiently long to allow for a trial on remaining indictments.292  Holding 
sequential trials also addresses the concerns about victims‘ rights to 
participation and to a remedy and about inadequate sentencing, since more 
charges and incidents can ultimately be adjudicated than if they are 
dropped altogether.   
                                                 
 289. Several hundred members of victims‘ groups protested in The Hague and Sarajevo, 
and burned in effigy various ICTY figures.  E.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Victims Groups 
Unhappy With Prospect of a (Reasonably) Manageable Karadzic Trial, OPINIOJURISBLOG, 
Sept. 17, 2009, http://opiniojuris.org/2009/09/17/victims-groups-unhappy-with-prospect-of-
a-reasonably-successful-karadzic-trial/; BalkanInsight.com, Victims Protest Hague 
Tribunal’s Work, Sept. 17, 2009 [hereinafter BalkanInsight.com], 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/22275.  
 290. BalkanInsight.com, supra note 289. 
 291. See PATRICIA M. WALD, TYRANTS ON TRIAL:  KEEPING ORDER IN THE COURTROOM 
20 (2009), 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publ
ications/tyrants_20090911/tyrants_20090911.pdf (noting that the Omarska trial with five 
defendants lasted only 113 trial days); Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pevkovic, Lazarevic, 
Lukic, & Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87, Case Information Sheet, 5, 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/cis/en/cis_sainovic_al_en.pdf (noting that the 
Milutinovic case, now known as the Sainovic case since Milutinovic‘s acquittal, with six 
defendants, lasted less than two years). 
 292. Of course, Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death and executed after his first trial, 
so no further trials occurred.  See Galbraith, supra note 234, at 133 n.199 (noting that 
―Kurds were frustrated that Hussein was executed for a conviction in relation to atrocities 
against 148 Shiites before the completion of his trial for atrocities committed against vast 
numbers of Kurds during the Anfal campaign‖).  Since the international tribunals allow for a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment, further trials will be possible.  See, e.g., Rome 
Statute, supra note 59, art. 77 (providing for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment). 
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However, this proposal may raise other human rights problems for 
prosecution of the later charges. If international tribunals give teeth to their 
guarantees of a speedy trial and follow the ECHR‘s conception of the right 
to a speedy trial—the right to have the process against one concluded 
expeditiously—sequential trials may run afoul of the right to a speedy 
trial.293  Issuing new charges only once a trial nears the end may be a way 
around this problem, but it raises other concerns about practicality and the 
fairness of the trial associated with pre-indictment delay. 
B. Revamping the Release Inquiry 
The inquiry into risk of flight and danger must be reworked for tribunals 
to reflect better international human rights norms.  This effort need not 
throw out the risk of flight or danger inquiries altogether, but rather must 
address the issues at their margin, such as the extent of judicial discretion, 
judicial rule-making, and the burden of proof.   
1.  Limiting the unbridled discretion of courts to detain 
Judges‘ discretion must be limited.  Judges should not be able to detain 
defendants if the grounds for detention set out in their tribunals‘ rules or 
statutes are not met.  Marking a significant human rights improvement over 
the ICTY, ICC judges have much less discretion on release than do ICTY 
judges.  At least in theory, if the requirements for detention are met,294 an 
accused must be detained.  If not, he or she must be released.295   
Limiting judicial discretion comports with the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR and national courts, which condemn boundless discretion of courts 
                                                 
 293. See Burke-White, supra note 53, at 84 (explaining that proactively encouraging  
prosecutions in domestic jurisdictions could save the ICC resources it needs to conduct 
investigations and prosecutions).  
 294. The ICC provides for provisional detention where ―there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and . . . 
[t]he arrest of the person appears necessary:  (i) To ensure the person‘s appearance at trial, 
(ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court 
proceedings, or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the 
commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the Court and 
which arises out of the same circumstances.‖ Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 58(1), 60.  
 295. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA 7), Judgment on 
the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I 
entitled ―Decision sur la demande de mise en liberte provisoire de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo‖, 
¶ 134 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Feb. 13, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc248155.PDF 
(―[T]he decision on continued detention or release pursuant to article 60(2) read with article 
58(1) of the Statute is not of a discretionary nature.‖); see also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 2, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against Pre-
Trial Chamber II‘s ―Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo‖, ¶ 59 
(Int‘l Crim. Ct. Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc787666.pdf (recalling 
the decision of Prosecutor v. Dyilo to acknowledge that Article 58(1) must be read with 
Article 60(2)). 
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on release.296  Restricting judges to detention only where provided by the 
rules also increases transparency in the decision-making process on release, 
which supports the defendant‘s right to a fair trial.297   
2. Eliminating the “Sufficiently Compelling Humanitarian 
Circumstances”  Requirement 
The ICTY should do away with and other tribunals should not adopt the 
―sufficiently compelling humanitarian circumstances‖ requirement.298  This 
measure again increases transparency of the decision-making process on 
release and places the focus back on the central question recognized by the 
ECtHR and domestic courts—whether there is a valid public interest in 
detaining the defendant that outweighs the defendant‘s liberty interest—
rather than on whether the defendant has some special liberty interest 
stemming from ―humanitarian circumstances,‖ like a sick relative.299   
To the extent that judges find that their rules on detention and release are 
inadequate, they should adhere to the normal procedures for changing 
them.  Adherence to the rules of the tribunal, again, increases transparency 
and is and appears fairer than when rules are created for a particular case.   
3. Placing the burden of persuasion to show the defendant is a flight risk 
or  danger on the prosecution 
Arguably, to comport with international human rights norms, the burden 
should be on the prosecution to prove risk of flight and danger.  Dissenting 
from a provisional release decision, Judge Robinson contended that the 
ICTY‘s Rule 65(B) should be read to place the burden of proof regarding 
flight risk or danger on the prosecution, but his view did not prevail.300  In a 
commentary on Judge Robinson‘s dissent, one scholar instead proposed 
amending the rule to explicitly place the burden of proving risk of 
nonappearance or danger to the community on the prosecutor.301   
                                                 
 296. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 297. See AMANN, supra note 120, at 212, 214–15 (noting that judicial independence, 
which can enhance impartiality, includes following procedure, and that impartiality and 
transparency help ensure that decisions are fair). 
 298. See supra notes 239–240 and accompanying text (describing the holding in Prlic). 
 299. See supra notes 248–250 and accompanying text. 
 300. Judge Robinson also maintained that the Trial Chamber lacked the discretion to 
refuse to grant provisional release unless the prosecution could demonstrate that the accused 
would not appear for trial and would pose a danger. DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1442 
(discussing Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on 
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001) (Robinson, J., dissenting)).  
 301. Id. at 1457.  Unlike Robinson, DeFrank argues that the Trial Chamber should retain 
the discretion to deny release even if the accused is neither a risk of flight nor a danger, 
which allows the Trial Chamber to ―serve[] as the final protector against risky or ill-advised 
provisional releases.‖  Id. at 1461. 
CAROLINE DAVIDSON.OFFTOPRINTER 60.1 
60 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1 
 
Shifting the burden of proof to the prosecution addresses several aspects 
of the defendants‘ rights concerns about provisional release at the ICTY.  
Consistent with the strictest formulation of the presumption of innocence, a 
defendant would not be put in a position of having to prove anything—
including the absence of a risk of flight or danger.302  As noted above, 
putting the burden of proof on the prosecution to show factors warranting 
detention is consistent with human rights jurisprudence at the ECtHR and 
in some national jurisdictions.303 Further, by making release more likely, 
the proposal promotes defendants‘ liberty and fair trial rights (since 
detention makes defending oneself harder). 
This approach may raise problems for victims‘ rights to protection and 
participation.  By making release more likely, this measure may jeopardize 
victims‘ rights to protection.304  Arguably, if the inquiry is meaningful, it 
should not.  To the extent that there is a danger to victims that no 
conditions for release can obviate, a defendant should not be released.  If 
prosecutors do their job in collecting and presenting evidence to show a 
danger or a flight risk, victims should still be protected.  By forcing the 
prosecution to beef up its case on danger, the proposal also could increase 
victim participation in release decisions by making witness testimony more 
critical at this stage.305 However, the difficulty in providing concrete 
evidence that a defendant poses a risk of flight or danger may make shifting 
the burden of proof problematic.   
The middle ground staked out by the United States federal system may 
provide a human rights-compatible compromise.  Pursuant to this approach, 
the defendant is presumed to present a flight risk or danger in certain 
serious cases, but the presumption is rebuttable.306  The prosecution still 
bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant poses a flight risk or danger.307  This approach avoids running 
afoul of the presumption of innocence‘s implication that the defendant 
should not have the burden of proving anything and is consistent with 
ECtHR precedent. 
                                                 
 302. See supra note 68 (discussing the presumption of innocence  and the burden of 
proof on issues not related to the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence). 
 303. Id. 
 304. See DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1460 (noting that ―the Tribunal only prosecutes 
‗serious violations of international humanitarian law‘‖). 
 305. However, the victims‘ participation would still be defined in a conventional, non-
victim-focused manner by placing control in the hands of the prosecution.  See supra note 
288. 
 306. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006). 
 307. Id. § 3142(f). 
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C. Compensation 
International tribunals should make explicit the right to compensation for 
unlawful detention and recognize the right to compensation for lengthy 
detention following an acquittal.  
Although the ICTY‘s statute and rules are silent on the possibility of 
compensation after unlawful detention, compensation for unlawful 
detention appears to be a tool that is increasingly available at international 
courts.  As noted above, the Appeals Chamber has held that a defendant 
who is unlawfully detained and acquitted is entitled to compensation.308  
The ECCC arrived at the same proposed remedy for the unlawful eight-
year pre-trial detention of defendant Kaing Guek Eav‘s (commonly known 
as ―Duch‖).309   
The ICC has formalized the right to compensation for unlawful detention 
through Article 85 of its statute.310  The ICC‘s rules provide that a Chamber 
of three judges, with no prior involvement in the accused‘s case, determine 
the lawfulness of the detention and the amount of compensation.311  To 
determine compensation, the Chamber must consider: ―the consequences of 
the grave and manifest miscarriage of justice on the personal, family, social 
and professional situation of the person filing the request.‖312  Still though, 
the ICC provides no compensation to defendants who were detained 
lawfully, but were acquitted after lengthy detention.   
International courts should consider providing compensation for lengthy 
detention if a defendant is acquitted.313  Compensation mitigates some of 
                                                 
 308. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor‘s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 75 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar. 31, 2000), 
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBarayagwiza%5Cdeci
sions%5Cdcs20000331.pdf; see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 256–57 (discussing the 
Appeals Chamber‘s decision in Barayagwiza).  See also supra notes  
301–03 (discussing Baraygwiza). 
 309. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias ―Duch‖, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 
Decision on Request for Release, ¶¶ 28–30, 35, 37 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of 
Cambodia June 15, 2009),  
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/353/E39_5_EN.pdf; see also Beth Van 
Schaack, Pre-Trial Detention Before the ECCC:  The Continuing Saga, 
INTLAWGRRLSBLOG, June 17, 2009, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2009/06/pre-trial-
detention-before-eccc.html (discussing Duch‘s detention by the Cambodian military court 
and the ECCC‘s ruling). 
 310. See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 85(1) (providing that ―[a]nyone who has been 
the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation‖); 
ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 74–75 (noting that the ad hoc tribunals lacked such a provision); 
Gordon, supra note 139, at 664 (citing Article 85, which affords victims of unlawful arrest 
or detention the right of compensation). 
 311. ICC Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rules 173–75; see also ZAPPALA, supra 
note 3, at 75 (noting the Rules have separated the proceedings to determine unlawfulness 
and compensation). 
 312. ICC Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 175. 
 313. See Johan David Michels, Compensating Acquitted Defendants For Detention 
CAROLINE DAVIDSON.OFFTOPRINTER 60.1 
62 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1 
 
the harm done to a defendant‘s rights through lengthy detention followed 
by an acquittal.314  It acknowledges the deprivation of his or her right to 
liberty and provides redress for the lost time.315  It also can fold in a 
measure of accountability for excessively lengthy trials by increasing the 
compensation based on the duration of the detention.  However, 
compensation does little to address the fair trial problems associated with 
detention before and during trial and, of course, cannot give back lost 
liberty.  Although victims may feel that paying a defendant compounds the 
injustice done by an acquittal,316 compensation in no way undermines the 
victims‘ rights to protection or participation. 
D. Recognizing Victims’ Rights 
To reflect the legitimacy of victims‘ rights among the panoply of human 
rights associated with criminal trials, the rules of provisional release should 
explicitly address victims‘ rights.  At the ICTY, victims‘ rights to 
protection are already largely addressed in the danger or future crime prong 
of the release inquiry.317  Courts should continue to examine carefully 
potential danger to victims in releasing international defendants.  In 
addition, victims should be given some participation rights in release 
decisions.  Embracing this emerging norm, both the ICC and the ECCC 
have afforded victims the right to participate in release decisions in some 
manner.318  
                                                 
Before International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 407, 408 (2010) (arguing that 
there is no human right to compensation after an acquittal at international criminal courts, 
but advocating a strict liability regime whereby acquitted defendants are compensated upon 
acquittal for policy reasons); see also Schomburg, supra note 6, at 25–26, 28 (advocating 
compensation for acquitted defendants detained for protracted periods of time). 
 314. Michels, supra note 313, at 418 (stating that compensation may give acquitted 
accused a sense of ―moral satisfaction‖). 
 315. Michels, supra note 313, at 417 (explaining that an acquitted person has paid 
society with pre-trial detention but he does not owe society any debt because he was not 
convicted, and therefore, society will be unjustly enriched if he is not compensated). 
 316. The angry reactions to the five year sentence of one defendant and acquittal of 
another in the Mrksic case in 2007, in which defendants had been accused of participating in 
killing 200 patients from the Vukovar hospital, might well have been even worse had the 
defendants been compensated for their lost time.  Croatian anger at Vukovar verdict:  
Croatia reacted angrily at verdicts pronounced by the UN war crimes tribunal in The 
Hague in the cases of three former Yugoslav Army officers, BBC NEWS, Sept. 28, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7017758.stm.  For information on the case generally, see the 
ICTY‘s main page regarding the Mrksic case, The Cases:  Mrksic et al. (IT-95-13/1) 
“Vukovar Hospital”, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/case/mrksic/4 (last visited July 17, 2010). 
 317. See DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1431 (noting that Rule 65(B) still requires the 
defense to show that the defendant would not pose a danger to victims if released). 
 318. See Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 2, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against Pre-Trial Chamber II‘s ―Decision on the Interim 
Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of 
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Recognizing victims‘ rights to participate does not mean giving victims 
carte blanche to decide release.  Rather, they are given an opportunity to 
give their views.  It is the court‘s decision, not the victims‘ submissions, 
that must be ―sober and objective.‖  As a practical matter, courts may adopt 
any number of procedural measures to keep victims from introducing more 
delay into the process.  For example, limiting victim participation to written 
submissions may represent a way to prevent delay in the proceedings.319  
The victims should have an opportunity to be heard, but not to take over the 
show.  
In addition, as Jonathan Doak puts it, courts are used to balancing 
competing rights and there is no reason to assume that weighing victims‘ 
rights against a defendant presents challenges any greater than weighing 
the state‘s rights against a defendant‘s rights, which courts do all the time 
in the provisional release context.320  
Further, since victims‘ submissions should be limited to the inquiry at 
hand—the risk of flight, danger or other factor set out in the tribunal‘s 
statute or rules—express participation rights may in fact improve 
defendants‘ chances.  It avoids judicial speculation on powerful if nebulous 
concerns about victims‘ ―perceptions‖ and interests that appear to have 
influenced the ICTY‘s decisions requiring ―sufficiently compelling 
humanitarian circumstances‖ for release.321 
                                                 
Germany, the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa‖, ¶¶ 27–28 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. 
Dec. 2, 2009),  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc787666.pdf (permitting the victims to present their 
submissions in the appeal); Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 
12, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I 
entitled ―Decision on the release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo‖, ¶¶ 27–30 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Oct. 
21, 2008),  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578365.pdf (permitting victims to raise arguments); 
see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional 
Detention Appeals, 103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 116, 119 (2009) (citing Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case 
No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01), Decision on Civil Party Participation in 
Provisional Detention Appeals (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Mar. 20, 
2008), 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/53/PTC_decision_civil_party_nuon_chea
_C11_53_EN.pdf) (describing the decision of the ECCC in Prosecutor v. Nuon which 
allowed victims to participate in the appeals of release decisions). 
 319. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the 
Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 15, 30 (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc727230.pdf (describing the submissions ofby victim representatives 
regarding the victims‘ position on Bemba‘s interim release). 
 320. DOAK, supra note 121, at 247–48. 
 321. See supra text accompanying note 266. 
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E. Measures to Make Release Feasible 
The difficult question—are we willing to let defendants accused of the 
heinous crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes out 
on provisional release—has already been answered in the affirmative.  At 
the ICTY and the ICC, defendants have been released before trial and 
during breaks in their trials.322  The leap to allowing them to remain free 
during trial seems a philosophically small, if logistically complicated, one. 
If defendants are to be released during trial, then some practical matters 
must be addressed.  As long as international tribunals are far from the 
defendants‘ homes,323 defendants must find a place to stay.  If they have the 
funds to rent an apartment in the host country, then they should be 
permitted to do so.324  ICTY decisions seldom addressed the issue of cost in 
releasing defendants to their home countries pre-trial or during court 
breaks.325  When they did, courts ordered the home country to bear the cost 
of transporting the defendant from Schiphol airport in the Netherlands.326  
                                                 
 322. E.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on 
Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 1, 24 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 2007), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/071214.pdf (granting Haradinaj‘s motion for 
provisional release during a court recess). 
 323. It seems that they often will be.  With cases involving defendants from all over the 
world, the ICC faces the problems of distance.  Moreover, ad hoc tribunals appear not to be 
a thing of the past.  The Lebanon tribunal, a mixed international and Lebanese tribunal, is 
just now setting up operations in The Hague.  See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, THE 
STL SIX MONTHS ON:  A BIRD‘S EYE VIEW 1 (2009), http://www.stl-
tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/presidents_reports/SixMonthReport_En.pdf (describing 
the activities of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in its first six months and its next steps). 
 324. In the ICTY‘s one instance of house arrest in lieu of pre-trial detention at the 
UNDU for the first defendant to voluntarily surrender to the tribunal, Tihomir Blaskic, the 
defendant, bore the costs of detention.  Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence Seeking Modification to the Conditions of Detention of 
General Blaskic, ¶ 1 (Int‘l Cirm. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 17, 1996); see also 
WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 235.  Blaskic was ordered to return to the UNDU for 
trial.  Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT‘L. L. 57, 78 (1999). 
 325. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, 
Decision on Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶ 24 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/071214.pdf (discussing the various 
responsibilities of the accused, the Registrar and security officers of the tribunal and 
UNMIK in transfer of Haradinaj to and from Kosovo, but not mentioning costs).  
 326. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion 
for Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002),  
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (ordering the FRY and Talic to 
bear jointly all expenses necessary for Talic‘s transport from Schiphol airport in the 
Netherlands to Belgrade and back); see also Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, 
Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Gvero‘s 
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 26(c) (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 
21, 2008), 
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This funding mechanism worked for the defendants before the ICTY, who 
still enjoyed popular support in their home countries, but has been and will 
continue to prove problematic for those, like the Rwandan defendants, who 
do not.327 
International tribunals must address the matter of housing for defendants 
who cannot afford to pay for accommodations in the host country.  The 
tribunal should either provide some dormitory where defendants can live or 
it should pay for modest accommodations.  Released defendants should be 
allowed considerably greater freedom of movement than the ICTY‘s 
detention center.   
Of course, this dormitory or tribunal-funded housing option runs the risk 
of being perceived as an agreeable UN-funded holiday by those back in the 
regions from which the defendants come, who may be living in even more 
modest accommodations themselves.  As noted above, the facilities in 
which ICTY and ICC defendants are detained, dubbed the ―Hague Hilton,‖ 
have already attracted bad press for being too pleasant for alleged war 
criminals and genocidaires.328  
This perception risks undermining the tribunals‘ expressive function of 
condemning the crimes for which the defendants are charged.  However, 
defendants have an incentive to behave in a respectful manner.  Should 
they be convicted, their conduct while on release may be taken into 
consideration in sentencing.329  Moreover, the time for expressing 
condemnation of the crimes is at sentencing, not through detention before a 
conviction. 
Another significant obstacle is the willingness of the host country to 
have international criminal defendants loose on its soil.  Early in the 
ICTY‘s existence, the Netherlands stated that an accused who is released to 
the Netherlands during a trial must apply for a residence permit.330  More 
                                                 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tdec/en/080721b.pdf (requiring Serbia to pay for the 
travel expenses as well as accommodations and security); Prosecutor v. Stanisic & 
Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 5(d) (Int‘l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf (ordering Serbia to 
assume responsibility ―for all expenses concerning accommodation, medical treatment and 
security of the Accused while on provisional release‖).   
 327. See Rearick, supra note 4, at 592–93 (noting that the ―Tutsi-dominated government 
[of Rwanda] has no incentive to accept Hutu detainees for provisional release‖ and the 
responsibilities of a host country discourage other countries from volunteering). 
 328. See, e.g., Carvajal, supra note 16. 
 329. Concededly, in some cases where defendants face extremely lengthy sentences, a 
couple of years here or there may seem little incentive to behave. 
 330. E.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 
Decision on Motion for Provisional Release Filed by the Accused Hazim Delic, ¶ 3 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 24, 1996), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/61024PR2.htm. 
CAROLINE DAVIDSON.OFFTOPRINTER 60.1 
66 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1 
 
recently, the Dutch authorities have made it clear that their acquiescence to 
provisional release of defendants is contingent on the defendants leaving 
the Netherlands.331  The recent decision of the ICC‘s Appeals Chamber in 
Bemba, which set aside the Pre-Trial Chamber‘s decision to release Bemba 
and held that release could not be decided without specifying workable 
arrangements, most importantly identifying a country willing to take the 
defendant, 332 indicates that the Netherlands is not alone in its reluctance to 
host international criminal defendants.333  
Tribunals must seek to overcome the hostility of host and other countries 
to absorbing, even temporarily, defendants accused of international crimes 
who meet the standard for release.  They should actively seek to make 
arrangements with the host country to allow international defendants on 
their territories outside of detention, preferably before the tribunals agree to 
set up shop there.334  The tribunals should also make arrangements in 
advance on the supervision of released defendants.  The tribunal should 
consider creating a division akin to pre-trial services in the United States 
federal system that is charged with assisting domestic authorities in 
monitoring released defendants.  Should the Netherlands or other host 
countries be unwilling to allow international criminal defendants on their 
soil, at a bare minimum, international tribunals should negotiate 
arrangements with other countries for release and supervision of defendants 
before trial and during court breaks, much as they negotiate with countries 
to take international defendants to serve their sentences.  
CONCLUSION 
Although the ICTY‘s limited release regime represents significant 
progress over the mandatory detention regime of the post-World War II 
                                                 
 331. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the 
Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic, ¶ 38 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002), 
 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (noting that the Dutch 
authorities had informed the Trial Chamber that they had no objection to Talic‘s release as 
long as he did not reside in the Netherlands thereafter). 
 332. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 2, Judgment on the 
appeal of the Prosecutor against Pre-Trial Chamber II‘s ―Decision on the Interim Release of 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian 
Republic, and the Republic of South Africa‖, ¶ 90 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Dec. 2, 2009), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc787666.pdf (holding that the Pre-Trial Chamber had 
erred when it granted release without finding a state willing to take Bemba).   
 333. See id. 
 334. Unfortunately, it is too late for the ICC to negotiate such an agreement in advance.  
ICC officials will have to do their best to negotiate with the Netherlands even though the 
tribunal is now firmly entrenched there. 
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tribunals, there remains room for improvement. For tribunals to achieve the 
important goal of promoting respect for human rights, changes are 
necessary. 
The ICC appears to be moving in the right direction. The ICC rules have 
tamped down on the ICTY‘s broad judicial discretion to deny release.335  
ICC Pre-Trial Chambers, despite granting victims a voice in the decision, 
thus far have been open to keeping defendants out of custody, at least 
before trial, where there the grounds for detention are not met.336  Finally, 
the ICC also has provisions to compensate defendants if they are illegally 
detained.   
Nevertheless, the recent ICC Appeals Chamber decision in Bemba shows 
that pressures on the tribunals to detain defendants remain strong. The 
decision demonstrates that practical constraints not addressed in advance 
may thwart ambitious human rights aims.  Moreover, it remains to be seen 
whether ICC defendants allowed to remain at liberty pre-trial will be 
permitted to remain at liberty during their trials.  The ICC should avoid the 
ICTY‘s precedent whereby the standard for release and detention changes 
as trial progresses.  Finally, the ICC and other emerging tribunals, like the 
Special Panel for Lebanon, would be well advised to consider in advance 
the arrangements to be made for the release of a defendant for whom no 
valid grounds for detention exist. 
 
                                                 
 335. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.   
 336. For example, the first defendant to voluntarily appear before the ICC on a 
summons, Abu Garda, was never detained.  He arrived at the court, and the ICC ―assigned‖ 
him a location where he should stay while he was in The Hague for his initial appearance.  
Press Release, ICC, Confirmation of charges hearing in the case of The Prosecutor v. Bahr 





%20scheduled. The location remained confidential and ―[wa]s considered an extension of 
the Court‘s premises.‖ Press Release, ICC, Bahr Idriss Abu Garda arrives at the premises of 
the Court (May 17, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%
20cases/icc02050209/press%20release/abu%20garda%20arrived%20at%20the%20premises
%20of%20the%20court.  Abu Garda was ―ordered not to leave the premises of the Court 
during his stay in The Netherlands without specific permission of the Chamber.‖ Id. After 
the hearing, Abu Garda left the Netherlands. Press Release, ICC, supra. 
